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ARGUMENT
I. HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION
The Respondent attempts to argue usage of Stucki v. Ellis, 20 I P .2d 486 (Utah
1949), as the foundation for a Homestead Exemption claim. It should be noted that Stucki
also includes this: "that the selection of the homestead was sufficiently manifest by the
V:b

fact of ownership, residence, use or occupation". And further: "By purchasing, occupying
and using the premises as a home for himself and family, Ellis sufficiently manifested
VI

that the property involved was his homestead." That's how Stucki identifies a Homestead.

Stucki even specifically identifies who can claim a homestead exemption: "an equitable
owner of land is entitled to assert a homestead exemption" (cited by In Re Cornia, Bankr.
Court D. Utah 2013).
There's a problem with Stucki, though. The case is rather old - 67 years old. In all
those decades, the Courts of Utah have had time to consider additional ideas, experiences,
and cases. Taking the best of the old, and leaving the parts that didn't really work so well.
Eventually, refining all of that into what constitutes a Homestead today. That current
definition is defined in the Utah statutes, U.C.A. 78B-5-503 (2) (a) "An individual is
entitled to a homestead exemption consisting of property in this state". "Property" as
VP

defined by 78B-5-502 (1) (d) means: (i) a primary personal residence; (ii) real property;
or (iii) an equitable interest in real property awarded to a person in a divorce decree by a
vJ

court.
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I am the individual, I purchased the home, I did make the claim, it was my primary
personal residence, it was real property, and I had all equitable interest in real property
awarded to me in the divorce decree by the Court. (Record on Appeal, R. 0164, ~ 13)
The Respondent further tries to make argument based on In Re Kochman, (Bankr.
Court, D. Connecticut 2011). If we are going to consider Connecticut law, we should also
include In re Kujan, 286 BR, 220 (Bankr. Court, D. Connecticut 2002), which includes: "
[E]xemption laws must be liberally construed in favor of a debtor and/or the debtor's
family, so that their purposes may be properly effectuated ... when there is a doubt as to a
statute's intent, it should be construed in favor of the debtor". As with many other cases
nationwide, including our own Utah law, the main point is the liberal application of
exemption laws in favor of the debtor.
However, Connecticut law does not control Utah law. Fortunately, Utah law still
recognizes the liberal application of exemption laws. "exemption laws must be liberally
construed in favor of the claimant to effect their humanitarian purposes." In re Godfrey,
386 B.R. 339, 341 (Bankr. Court D. Utah 2008). "It has always been the general policy of
this and most other courts that homestead statutes should be liberally construed" In Re

Cornia, (Banlcr. Court, D. Utah 2013), footnote [14].
"The general purpose of a homestead exemption is to protect citizens and their
families from the miseries of destitution." P.I.E. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Bass,
759 P. 2d 1144, 1145 (Utah: Supreme Court 1988). What we have going on here is a

2
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mother threatening her own children with potential homelessness so that she can get
money. What could be more miserable and destitute than that happening to the kids?
Considering this is a divorce case involving children, there is nothing more contrary to
their best interests than what their own mother is putting at risk.
The Wiles v. Wiles, 871 P.2d 1026 (Utah App. 1994) case continues to be not
applicable. With federal law superseding state law, the Wiles case being as old as it is, the
Wiles liens being placed for the purpose of property division at time of divorce and not
\.@

for post divorce judgments, the Wiles case just doesn't parallel the present case before the
court.

~

One must also consider just what is a spouse? Black's Law Dictionary explains
that a spouse is "one's wife or husband". A husband being "a married man; one who has
a lawful wife living. The correlative of "wife"". See also 1 U.S. Code § 7 ("and the word
'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife"). The
Respondent and I are not married by law. I do not have a lawful, living wife. Therefore, I

~

do not have a spouse, nor am I a spouse to anybody. Thus, by definition, it is impossible
for me to use the homestead law against a spouse which I do not have. In Respondent's
recent filing of Petitioner for Modification, Respondent clarifies that we are no longer
husband and wife "The parties were formerly husband and wife having been divorced
pursuant to a Decree of Divorce". The two parties are no longer spouses, and, thus, Wiles

vi)

v. Wiles does not apply.
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II. IMPROPER SERVICE
An interesting thing to note is that Respondent still hasn't produced anything to
show nor verify that the documents were actually sent via email. All Respondent has to
do is print out a copy of the email showing sent date and time, and this issue of service
would be readily concluded in Respondent's favor. Yet Respondent produces nothing.
Instead, Respondent's attorney has spent numerous hours researching case law, for
both this appeal, and at the trial court level, at the cost of at least $225.00 an hour, to
argue the manner in which the courts' receive conclusive evidence. It only takes minutes
to print out a copy of an email. It could easily be inferred that Respondent's attorney
compounds the issue, by purposely not showing any evidence supporting their
~

statements, in order to cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, which is in direct
violation of URCP 11 (b )( 1). And would warrant appropriate sanctions.
III. FEES AND COSTS
Fees and costs should be awarded to Petitioner upon ruling in Petitioner's favor in
accordance with Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 34.
The Court should not "rebrand" any of Respondent's fees, costs nor judgments as
"family support". The Respondent is trying to get the Court and/or the Office of
Recovery Services (ORS) to act as a surrogate collection agency. Not only is there a
complete absence of rules, statutes and case law in support of reclassifying fees, costs or
judgments, the Court is not allowed to assist one party nor the other.

4
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The District Court is also aware of this, declaring "I'll allow you to collect the way
creditors collect", without any assistance from the Court, whether in reclassification nor
~

collection efforts. (R. 3149)
ORS' role is to collect on behalf of the children - not the Respondent. ORS/CSS "is
responsible for collecting child and medical support" for the children. (See Utah
Department of Human Services, Recovery Services, Frequently Asked Questions)
In addition to all that, the classification of fees, costs or judgments was not
preserved by Respondent at the trial court. Thus, the Respondent's request is not within
the jurisdiction of this Appellate Court to consider the matter.
CONCLUSION

This appellate court should: reverse the District Courts denial of Petitioner's
Homestead exemption.
This appellate court should remand the District Court for further proceedings to
require Respondent to produce some form of verification as to whether the emails were
~

actually sent. If Respondent cannot produce admissible verification, sanctions should be
issued against the Respondent in the amount of Respondent's attorney's fees,
Respondent's proposed orders should be vacated, and Petitioner's proposed orders
entered in their stead.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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•
This appellate court should award fees and costs in favor of Petitioner, in an
equivalent amount that Respondent's attorney would charge, to be applied towards
payment of Respondent's judgments.

DATED this k_ day of__./bp
~,,,_'-r.,:._5--'./---_ _ _ _ , 2016.

~/#
Dean White
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I ce11ify that in compliance with Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(f)(l), this
Reply Brief contains 1268 words. I ce11ify that in compliance with Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure 27(b), this Reply Brief has been propo11ionally spaced with Times
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DATED this

3.1_ day of

.Jlf,yc.,,).J/
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386 B.R. 339 (2008)

In re Chris D. GODFREY, Debtor.
No. 07-24065.

vJ

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Utah.
April 21, 2008.
340

*340 Lewis P. Adams, Salt Lake City, UT, for Debtor.
Kevin R. Anderson, Janci M. Lawes, Salt Lake City, UT, Chapter 13 Trustee.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
WILLIAM T. THURMAN, Bankruptcy Judge.

\ti}

The matters before the Court are the Debtor's request seeking confirmation of a chapter 13 plan and the chapter 13 Trustee's
objection to the Debtor's claimed homestead exemption. The Court conducted a hearing on February 21, 2008 at which the
chapter 13 Trustee appeared through counsel, Janci M. Lawes, and the Debtor appeared with counsel, Lewis P. Adams. The
Court directed the parties to submit additional briefing on the issue of whether the Debtor was entitled to claim a homestead
exemption on proceeds from the sale of his home. The Court has considered the supplemental briefing and arguments of
counsel and the Debtor's proffered testimony and now issues this Memorandum Decision.
For the reasons set forth herein, the Court overrules the chapter 13 Trustee's objection to the Debtor's claimed homestead
exemption.
~

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
The Court has jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) and (L). Venue is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. §
1408(1 ).

II. BACKGROUND
The Debtor initially filed this case under chapter 7 on August 30, 2007. Two weeks prior to filing, the Debtor sold his
condominium in Salt Lake City (the "Residence"). After paying off underlying secured claims and closing costs, the Debtor

ViJ

received approximately $11,200 from the sale of the Residence.
On the date of petition, the Debtor claimed an $11,200 homestead exemption on Schedule C and listed $11,200 as "Proceeds
from Sale of Residence" in response to Item 19 on Schedule B. The Debtor's Statement of Financial Affairs also identified the
sale of his Residence as a transfer made within two years of filing.
Between the time the Debtor sold his Residence and the date of petition, the Debtor voluntarily transferred proceeds derived from
the sale to his father, a future landlord, his fiance and others. Specifically, the Debtor purchased a wedding ring from his father for
$4,600. The Debtor also transferred $1,700 to his future landlord as a deposit on an apartment and paid $500 as a pet deposit.
Finally, the Debtor paid $850 on his fiance's Visa credit card and purchased $995.33 in euros which the Debtor and his new wife
used on their honeymoon. None of the transfers set forth above were disclosed on the Debtor's initial Statement or Schedules.
341

*341 On October 2, 2007, the chapter 7 Trustee conducted the scheduled meeting of creditors pursuant to § 341 of the Code.ill
At that time or shortly thereafter, the chapter 7 Trustee ascertained that the Debtor had not disclosed the disposition of proceeds
from the sale of his Residence.
On November 1, 2007, the chapter 7 Trustee filed an objection to the Debtor's claimed homestead exemption asserting that the
Digitized byproceeds
the Howard
Law Library,
J. Reuben
Clark Law
BYU.
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theHunter
sale and
concealed
the transfers
in School,
violation
of§ 522(g). On November 11,
Debtor had voluntarily transferred
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~

2007, the Debtor filed a motion to convert his case to one under chapter 13. The Debtor scheduled a hearing on this motion for
December 10, 2007. The Debtor also simultaneously filed amended Schedules B and C, and an amended Statement of
Financial Affairs.
The chapter 7 Trustee appeared through counsel at the December 10, 2007 hearing, but did not object to the Debtor's motion to
convert. The Court conducted an independent inquiry regarding the Debtor's good faith in electing to convert,@ and
subsequenUy granted the Debtor's motion. Shortly thereafter, the Debtor filed a chapter 13 plan. On January 31, 2008, the
chapter 13 Trustee objected to the Debtor's plan and filed an objection to the Debtor's claimed homestead exemption.

Ill. ANALYSIS
As an initial position, the chapter 13 Trustee asserts that under Utah law "proceeds" must be kept in their original form and not
used to purchase or pay for other items in order to qualify for the homestead exemption. Because the Debtor transferred a portion
of the proceeds, the chapter 13 Trustee asserts that the exemption must fail. The Debtor asserts that the proceeds he received
from the sale of his Residence are exempt under Utah lawm regardless of their form or character.I!l
The chapter 13 Trustee also asserts that the Debtor forfeited his exemption when he used the proceeds to purchase items not
related to basic levels of shelter and support.lfil Finally, the chapter 13 Trustee asserts that the Debtor's homestead exemption
should be denied in full or in part under bankruptcy law because the Debtor voluntarily transferred a portion of the proceeds and
then concealed the transfers in his chapter 7 case in violation of§ 522(9).
~

The Court begins with the premise that, as a general proposition, exemption laws must be liberally construed in favor of the
342

claimant to effect their humanitarian purposes.Ifil The determination of exemption issues in bankruptcy frequently *342 requires
and sometimes mandates application of state law.lll The Court was unable to locate any case in which the Utah Supreme Court
has determined that proceeds must be kept in their original form in order to qualify for the homestead exemption.lfil Thus, the
Court's task is to predict how the Utah Supreme Court would interpret the statute under the circumstances of this case.Ifil The

~

Court is guided in its analysis by the Utah Constitution and Utah case law which promote the allowance of homestead
exemptions.I.1Ql
From the Court's perspective, it makes litUe sense to require a debtor to escrow, sequester, or place proceeds under a mattress
for the one-year period permitted under Utah law in order to maintain the homestead exemption. If a debtor needs or wants to

~

use those proceeds, nothing in Utah's exemption statute prohibits the debtor from doing so. Accordingly, the Court determines
that Utah's homestead exemption necessarily includes disposition of sale proceeds for other purposes and extends to proceeds
voluntarily transferred by a debtor.illl
The chapter 13 Trustee also asserts that the Debtor's homestead exemption should be denied under§ 522(g)Ull because the
Debtor voluntarily transferred a portion of the proceeds and then concealed the transfers in his chapter 7 case. The Court agrees
that the Debtor's failure to list the transfers in his initial Statement and Schedules was inadequate and led unnecessarily to
343

questions about his honesty •343 and good faith. However, the Court finds that sufficient disclosure of the existence of sale
proceeds was made when the Debtor claimed an $11,200 homestead exemption on Schedule C, listed "Proceeds from Sale of
Residence" on Schedule B, and identified the sale of his Residence as a transfer made within two years of filing on his Statement
of Financial Affairs. Moreover, the Debtor subsequently amended his schedules to reflect where he spent and otherwise
disposed of his homestead proceeds.llll This is contrasted against other situations where the disclosures have been completely
missing resulting in a denial of an exemption where the truth of the claimed asset was not disclosed.1.1!1
In addition, no evidence of fraudulent intent was presented to the Court. It appears to the Court that the Debtor sold his
condominium in an effort to raise some cash to get married. The Debtor took the sale proceeds, bought a wedding ring, and went
~

on a honeymoon. Then, with the balance of the sale proceeds, the Debtor made deposits on residential rental property. Under
the facts of this case, the Court cannot find that the Debtor made the transfers to hinder, delay or defraud creditors.llfil
The Court also notes that the chapter 7 Trustee elected not to challenge the Debtor's conversion from chapter 7 to chapter 13.
Had the chapter 7 Trustee objected to conversion and presented evidence of bad faith, such as fraudulent intent on the part of
the Debtor in making the transfers, the Court may not have granted the Debtor's motion to convert under the parameters of
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Marrama.llfil The issue of not properly scheduling the transfers could possibly be a badge of lack of good faith. However, this
issue was not probed at the conversion hearing except by the Court as indicated above. As a result, the Court has impliedly
made a finding of good faith in the Debtor's conversion from chapter 7 to chapter 13, and the Court determines that it would be
incongruent to disallow the exemption on the same evidence.

IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court determines that proceeds from the sale of a home need not be retained in their original form to
qualify for the homestead exemption and sale proceeds may be disbursed for other purposes without jeopardizing the
exemption. The Court further determines that the Debtor's transfers were not concealed within the ambit of§ 522(9). The Debtor's
344

homestead exemption is allowed and the disclosures, although terse, are not sufficient when compared to what *344 was
disclosed to constitute a lack of good faith under§ 1325(b)(3) and are not a bar to confirmation.
A separate order accompanies this Memorandum Decision.

ill All statutory references herein are to the Bankruptcy Code unless stated otherwise.
~ See Marrama

v.

Citizens Bank of Massachusetts,

U.S.

1

127 S.Ct. 1105 166 L.Ed.2d 956 {2007).

[fil The Utah Exemption Act applies in this case because Utah has opted out of the federal exemption scheme contained in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d).
~

UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78-23-3(5)(b) provides: "The proceeds of any sale, to the amount of the exemption existing at the time of sale, is exempt
from levy, execution, or other process for one year after the receipt of the proceeds by the person entitled to the exemption."

[fil The Court understands that Utah's homestead exemption is designed to protect the "dependent and helpless" and insure such persons shelter
and support free from fear of a forced sale. See Sanders v. Cassit'6 586 P.2d 423, 425 {Utah 1978). However, for purposes of this decision, the
Court declines to specify the types of purchases or expenditures that constitute "shelter and support" under Utah law.

[fil See Carlson v. Diaz fin re Carlson), 303 B.R. 478,482 {10th Cir. BAP 2004}.

VD

III See Butner v.

United States 440 U.S. 48, 55, 99 S.Ct. 914, 59 L.Ed.2d 136 {1979).

[fil In Giesy-Walker Co. v. Briggs 49 Utah 205, 162 P. 876, 879 l 1916} the Utah Supreme Court stated: "The intention of the statute in giving the
homestead claimant the right to claim the proceeds of sale of his homestead as exempt for a period of one year from the receipt thereof is to permit
him to acquire another homestead and to pay therefor with such proceeds: It is the opinion of this Court that Giesy-Walker does not amend Utah's
Exemption Act to require homestead claimants to utilize sale proceeds solely for the purpose of acquiring another home.
~

[fil See Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F.3d 1107 1118 (10th Cir.2002) ("When the federal courts are called upon to interpret state law, the federal court
must look to the rulings of the highest state court, and, if no such rulings exist, must endeavor to predict how that high court would rule.").

[1QJ. See Article XXII, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution. See also P.I.E. Employees Federal Credit Union v. Bass, 759 P.2d 1144, 1151 {Utah 1988)
(homestead exemption statutes must be construed and interpreted to give effect to the purposes and objects the framers of the constitution and the
legislature had in mind); Panag_oe,ulos v. Manning. 93 Utah 198 1 69 P.2d 614. 618 (1937) (the object of the homestead exemption is to "assure to

~

the unfortunate debtor ... the shelter and influence of the home; and in its promotion courts may well employ the most liberal and humane rules of
interpretation").

l1:!J The Court recognizes that the homestead statutes of some states explicitly exempt funds obtained from the voluntary sale of a homestead only
if the proceeds are kept separate and apart and held for the sole purpose of acquiring another home within a certain period of time. The Utah
Exemptions Act contains no such limiting language. Debtors in Utah may elect to reinvest their exempt funds in another home, but they are not
statutorily obligated to do so.
i..@

[12l Section 522(g)(1) provides as follows: "Notwithstanding sections 550 and 551 of this title the debtor may exempt under subsection (b) of this
section property that the trustee recovers under section 510(c)(2), 542, 543, 550, 551, or 553 of this title, to the extent that the debtor could have
exempted such property under subsection (b) of this section if such property had not been transferred, if( 1) (A) such transfer was not a voluntary transfer of such property by the debtor; and
(8) the debtor did not conceal such property; ...
~

Rule 1009( a) of the Bankruptcy Rules allows a debtor to amend schedules "as a matter of course" at any time before the case is closed.

J.lil The Tenth Circuit BAP recently determined that exemptions may be curtailed or denied where there has been lack of full disclosure. See
Scrivner v. Mashburn (In re Scrivner}, 370 B.R. 346 {10th Cir. BAP 2007). Other courts have reached similar conclusions. See Cogliano v.
Anderson fin re Cogliano), 355 B.R. 792 {9th Cir. BAP 2006): In re Mazon, 368 B.R. 906 {Bankr.M.D.Fla.2007).
Vi)
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11.fil See Tavenner v. Smoot

257 F.3d 401 (4th Cir.2001} cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1116 122 S.Ct. 926 151 l.Ed.2d 890 {2002}. Tavenner involved
an adversary proceeding brought by the trustee to avoid a transfer under § 548. The Court finds its analysis helpful on the question of intent of the
Debtor in making the transfers. The ultimate determination in the present case may require a trustee to commence adversary proceedings against
the transferees which would require a finding of fraudulent intent on the part of the Debtor.

I.1fil See Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts,

U.S.

, 127 S.Ct. 1105, 166 L.Ed.2d 956 {2007).

Save trees - read court opinions online on Google Scholar.
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In re: Susan Koch man and Gregory Koch man, Chapter 7, Debtors.
Case No.11-50111.

vi

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Connecticut, Bridgeport Division.
November 3, 2011.
Timothy Miltenberger, Esq., Coan, Lewendon, Gulliver & Miltenberger, LLC, New Haven, CT, for the Ch. 7 Trustee.

~

David S. Torrey, Esq., Medina, Torrey, Mamo & Camacho, P.C., Norfolk, CT, for the Debtors.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON OBJECTION TO EXEMPTION
ALAN H. W. SHIFF, Bankruptcy Judge.
The chapter 7 trustee objects to a homestead exemption the debtors have claimed in property owned by their limited liability
company, Kochman Holdings Group, LLC. For the reasons that follow, the trustee's objection is sustained.

Backgroundill
The debtors are joint owners of Kochman Holdings Group, LLC ("LLC"), a single asset real estate holding company established
in 2000 to hold title to 9 Railroad Street in West Cornwall, Connecticut (hereafter, "Property"). A two-story building is located on
the Property. The debtors conduct their respective businesses on the first floor and use a portion of the second floor as their
residence. The remainder of the second floor is utilized by them for personal and business purposes. There is no evidence in the

vi>

record regarding the percentage offloor space on the second floor that is used by the debtors as their residence.
On January 25, 2011, the debtors filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. On the cover sheet of
their petition, they stated that their street address was that of the Property. On "Schedule B -

Personal Property" at No. 13, "Stock

and interests in incorporated and unincorporated businesses", the debtors disclosed, inter alia: their joint ownership in the LLC
which is a "Single Asset Real Estate Holding Company Being used as Debtor's [sic] Primary Residence" and valued at $200,000.
(Doc.#. 15 at 3)(emphasis added). On "Schedule C -Property Claimed As Exempt", the debtors designated 11 U.S. C § 522(b)
(3) as the statute under which they would claim exemptions;§ 522(b)(3) permits them to elect exemptions under state law. They
then listed the LLC on Schedule C under the column entitled "Description of Property" and again noted that it was 11Being used as
Debtor's [sic] Primary Residence". (Id. at 6.). Under the column requiring a debtor to "Specify Law Providing Each Exemption", the
debtors designated "Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-362(t)", Connecticut's homestead exemption. (Id.) Under the column relating to the
11

"Value of Claimed Exemption", the debtors stated $88,306.79". (Id.) Under the column relating to the "Current Value of the
Property without Deducting Exemption", they stated $"200,000.00". (Id.) It is undisputed that there is an outstanding mortgage of
$111,693.21 on the Property (see id. at 8 C'Schedule D -

Creditors Holding Secured Claims"), which cannot be the subject of an

exemption, see Conn. Gen. Stat.§ 523-62(t). Accordingly, the debtors have claimed as a homestead exemption 100% of the
value of the Property less the mortgage.
On March 30, 2011, the trustee objected to the debtors' claimed homestead exemption. As the objecting party, the trustee has the
burden of proving that the homestead exemption is not properly claimed. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(c).

Discussion
In Connecticut, "any natural person shall be" entitled to exempt, inter alia, "(t) [tJhe homestead of the exemptioner to the value of
seventy-five thousand dollars ... provided value shall be determined as the fair market value of the real property less the amount
of any statutory or consensual lien which encumbers it ..." Conn. Gen. Stat.§ 52-352b(t) (2009) (emphasis added). A
"homestead" is defined as "owner-occupied real property ... used as a primary residence." Id. at§ 52-352a (e) (2005) (emphasis

~
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Under Connecticut law, exemptions-including the homestead exemption-"afforded by General Statutes§ 52-352a, apply only

~

to ·property of any natural person'." Shawmut Bank, N.A. v. Valley Farms, et al., 222 Conn. 361. 366 (1992}. The Valley Farms
court stated that "[a)lthough the term ·natural person' is not defined ..., it clearly means a human being, as opposed to an artificial
or juristic entity." Id. (emphasis added). It further concluded that persons are "free to own their... assets in individual or joint
ownership forms and thereby retain the statutory exemption available to natural persons." Id. at 367 (further citation omitted).
~

However, where persons choose to do so through an artificial entity, "presumably [for) some legal advantage, ... they must
accept any legal disadvantage that arises from the limitation of§ 52-352b to property owned by a natural person." Id.
As Mrs. Kochman admitted, the Property is owned by the LLC. (See a/so Trial Exhibit B (Warranty Deed dated Oct. 30, 2000,
granting the Property to the LLC.) Thus, while there is no dispute that it is real property and that part of it is being used as the
debtors' primary residence, it is conceded that the LLC, and not the debtors, is the owner of the Property. Cf., Valley Farms, 222
Conn. at 367 (affirming a trial court's finding that the homestead exemption does not apply to property of partnerships). See also
Kuian, 286 B.R. at 220-21 (the threshold requirement to claim a homestead exemption Is that "the individual must ·own' the
subject real property within the meaning of Section 52-352a" (emphasis added)).
The debtors argue that under the "equitable doctrine" of "negative piercing of the corporate veil", they, as the owners of the LLC,
should be deemed the owners of the Property. Their trial counsel appears to argue that so long as the debtors acted in good faith
when the LLC was formed, the Property should be treated as though it was owned by them for homestead exemption purposes.
In support of that theory, Mrs. Kochman testified that, in 2000, she had no understanding as to why her attorneyru advised her to
establish the LLC and then put legal title of the Property in the name of the LLC. Instead, according to Mrs. Koch man, doing so
was merely a "technical" transaction and done with no improper motive.
Although the court is persuaded that Mrs. Koch man did not understand the purpose of placing title in the LLC, it is also confident

•

that the debtors' attorney fully understand the benefits that flow from putting title to the Property in an artificial entity, e.g., keeping
it beyond the reach of the debtors' creditors. Therefore, the court is troubled by the argument, raised in the name of equity in this
court of equity, that an individual can place ownership of property into an artificial entity and, therefore, out of the reach of
creditors asserting a claim against that individual, but at some later time, that same individual can claim ownership in the
~

property, albeit equitably, so as the be entitled to claim a homestead exemption in il Simply put, as did the Valley Farm court,
when an individual chooses to take advantage of the benefits of an artificial entity, he or she must also bear the corresponding
burdens. Accordingly, there is no basis upon which the Property can be claimed exempt by the debtors.
The same result follows from the fact that the debtors have failed to define the percentage of the Property that might be a
homestead. Rather, they claim the entire Property as exempt and make that claim notwithstanding their concession that they only
use a portion of the second floor as their residence. As noted, supra at 2, the debtors valued the Property at $200,000, and it is
encumbered with a mortgage of approximately $112,000. Thus, the net equity in the Property is approximately $88,000, the
amount claimed as exempt under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-352b(t). However, since only an unknown portion of the second floor is
used as the debtors' primary residence, and no evidence was offered as to the value of that residential portion, there is no way to
calculate the amount of the exemption. In sum, even if the debtors were entitled to claim a homestead exemption, their claim for

~

the entire $88,000 is patently objectionable.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the trustee's objection is sustained.
[11At the October 25, 2011 hearing on the Trustee's Objection, the parties stipulated to the relevant facts and, upon consent, admitted into evidence
several documents. In addition, Mrs. Kochman gave credible testamentary evidence at the hearing. The court relies on the stipulations, exhibits, and
testimony in this "Background" section.

raI [T]here are three requisites for real property to constitute an individual's statutory homestead. First, the individual must "onw□" the subject real
property within the meaning of Section 52-352a as of the relevant time. Second, the individual must "occup(y]" the subject real property within the
meaning of Section 52-352a as of the relevant time. Third, the subject real property must be "used as a primary residence" within the meaning of

~

Section 52-352a as of the relevant time.

Kuian.

286 B.R. at 220-21.

QI The court notes that this was not Attorney Torrey.
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In re Patricia M. KUJAN, Debtor.
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United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Connecticut.

December 11, 2002.
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•217 Roberta Napolitano, Bridgeport, CT, Chapter 7 Trustee.
Charles D. O'Hara, Jr., Charles D. O'Hara, Jr., P.C., Bridgeport, CT, for Debtor.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: TRUSTEE'S OBJECTION TO DEBTOR'S
CLAIM OF HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION
LORRAINE M. WEIL, Bankruptcy Judge.
The matter before the court is the chapter 7 trustee's (the "Trustee") objection to the above-referenced debtor's {the "Debtor")
claim of a homestead exemption under applicable Connecticut law in respect of her former marital residence located at 4634

I..Jii

Black Rock Turnpike in Fairfield, Connecticut (the "Property").ill

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Debtor commenced this chapter 7 case by a petition (included in Doc. 1.0. No. 1, the "Petition") filed on November 8, 1999
(the "Petition Date"). Simultaneously, the Debtor filed her schedules and Statement of Financial Affairs (included in Doc. 1.0. No.
1, the "Original Schedules").
The Original Schedules state that the Debtor is divorced and has two children: a daughter (age 15 as of the Petition Date); and a
son (age 11 as of the Petition Date). (See Original Schedules, Schedule I (Current Income of Individual Debtors).) The Petition
listed the Debtor's address as 12 Field Street, Seymour, Connecticut. The Original Schedules disclose that the Debtor rents the
relevant Field Street premises on a month-to-month lease. (See Original Schedules, Schedule G (Executory Contracts and
Unexpired Leases).) The Original Schedules state that, as of the Petition Date, the Debtor owned no real property. (See Original
Schedules, Schedule A (Real Property).) On the Debtor's Schedule B (Personal Property), the Debtor listed as an asset the
following: "Alimony $500/mo; Property Settlement: upon sale of marital home when youngest child reaches age 18, debtor will
receive $74,000.00." (Original Schedules, Schedule B (Personal Property) at item 16.) The Debtor did not claim either the
Property or the referenced "property settlement" as exempt in the Original Schedules. (See Original Schedules, Schedule C
(Property Claimed as Exempt).) The Debtor received a chapter 7 discharge on February 22, 2000. (See Doc. 1.0. No. 6.) On
February 13, 2002, the Trustee filed a Motion To Administratively Close Case and Reserve Rights to This Bankruptcy Estate with
218

Regard to an Asset *218 (Doc. l.D. No. 8, the 11Administrative Closure Motion"). The Administrative Closure Motion alleges in
relevant part as follows:
4. There is ... an ... asset [of the estate] consisting of an obligation [the "Obligation"] by the former husband of ...
[the Debtor], John Kujan, to pay the estate the sum of $74,000 when ... [the Debtor's son) reaches the age of 18,
in 2006, or upon the sale of the [P]roperty....

~

6. There do not appear to be any other nonexempt assets in this estate, and it would be impractical to keep this
estate open until such time as the [O]bligation matures. In the opinion of the ... [Trustee], it would be appropriate
to administratively close this estate at this time and to reserve the rights of this bankruptcy estate in and to the ...
[O]bligation ....
(Administrative Closure Motion at 1-2.)
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The Debtor responded to the Administrative Closure Motion in two ways. First, on February 19, 2002, the Debtor filed an
amended Schedule C (Property Claimed as Exempt). (See Doc. I.D. No. 14, "Amended Schedule C.") Amended Schedule C
claims the relevant exemption as follows: "Equitable Distribution rights to ... [the Property], arising from property settlement
agreement with former spouse." (Amended Schedule C.) Under the column responding to Schedule C's direction to "[s]pecify
[l]aw [p]roviding [e]ach [e]xemption," Amended Schedule C states:"§ 52-352b(t) [the Connecticut homestead exemptioniru: In re

McCulley, 150 B.R. 358 (Bankr.M.D.Pa.1993)." (Amended Schedule C.) Amended Schedule C values the claimed exemption at

~

$74,000 and appears to value the Property itself at $180,000.00 (gross). (See Amended Schedule C.)
In addition to filing Amended Schedule C, the Debtor also filed Debtor's Objection to Trustee's Motion To Reserve Rights To Asset
(Doc. I.D. No. 13, the "Administrative Closure Objection"). The Administrative Closure Objection alleges in relevant part as
follows:
2. In ... Amended Schedule C, Debtor ... exempts a property settlement distribution p.e., the Obligation] due her
from her former husband in the amount of $74,000.00 and which was previously disclosed in [Original] Schedule

B.
3. The exemption of $74,000.00 is pursuant to C.G.S. § 52-352b{t)-the Connecticut Homestead Exemption.
4. Debtor possesses a marital interest in ... [the P]roperty.... Said property was jointly owned by Debtor and her
husband, John W. Kujan, prior to their divorce in March, 1999. Pursuant to a property settlement which was
incorporated into a divorce decree [the "Decree'1 on March 5, 1999, the Debtor quitclaimed her undivided one-half
interest in the [P]roperty to her Husband. In return, the Husband agreed to pay Debtor $16,000.00 within 30 days
~

after the ... [D]ecree was entered; and the sum of$74,000.00 when the youngest child reached the age of 18 or
when the [P]roperty was sold, whichever occurred first. The total payment of $90,000.00 to the Debtor under the ..
. [D]ecree represented the Debtor's one-half share in the equity of the ... [P]roperty.
219

5. It is the payment of $74,000.00 which has not yet been made by Debtor's *219 former spouse ... which the
Debtor exempts pursuant to C.G.S. § 52-352b(t).

(Administrative Closure Objection at 1.pl The Trustee responded to Amended Schedule C by filing the Trustee's Objections to
Property Claimed as Exempt (Doc. 1.0. No. 15, the "Trustee's Objection"). In the Trustee's Objection, the Trustee objected to the
Debtor's claim of homestead exemption under Connecticut law in respect of "'[e]quitable distribution rights to [the Property) ...
arising from property settlement agreement with former spouse"' on the grounds that "[t]he Property does not fit ... [the] definition
[of homestead under Conn. Gen.Stat.§ 52-352a]." {Trustee's Objection.)
A hearing on the Administrative Closure Motion and the Administrative Closure Objection originally was scheduled for March 6,

~

2002 but was continued by agreement to March 27, 2002.1£ A hearing (the "Hearing") on the Trustee's Objection was held on
March 27, 2002. Other than the Trustee's introduction into evidence of two exhibits,lfil no evidence was proffered at the Hearing.
Rather, arguments of counsel were heard and a post-hearing briefing schedule was ordered. The court took the matter under
advisement pending post-trial briefing and reserved the right to schedule an evidentiary hearing should that appear appropriate
after review of the post-trial briefs of the parties. After review of the parties' initial post-trial briefs, the court issued an order {Doc.

~

I.D. No. 23, the "Briefing Order") directing the parties to submit further briefs on the issue of whether the Obligation might be
exempt under the Connecticut homestead exemption statute as proceeds of a homestead. The parties have completed the
requested further briefing {the "Further Briefing") in accordance with the Briefing Order and the matter is ripe for decision.
The following facts are undisputed. On or about March 5, 1999, the Connecticut Superior Court dissolved the marriage of the
Debtor and her then-husband, John W. Kujan. Prior to institution of those proceedings, the Debtor and her then-husband owned
the Property either as joint tenants or tenants-in-common. In the referenced marital dissolution proceedings, the Superior Court
issued the Decree incorporating the Stipulation. Among other things, the Stipulation provided that Mr. Kujan would pay, as a
"property settlement," the sum of $74,000.00 (i.e., the Obligation) upon the earlier to occur of the Debtor's son's reaching the age
of 18 years or Mr. Kuja n's sale of the Property. The couple's then minor children were to live with Mr. Kujan at the Property. The
Stipulation was recorded in the land records of the Town of Fairfield with respect to the Property. Under the terms of the
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220

delivered the Quitclaim Deed to Mr. Kujan ·220 which deed was duly recorded in the land records of the Town of Fairfield. The
Quitclaim Deed, by its terms, conveyed to Mr. Kujan "all the right. title, interest, claim and demand whatsoever as the ... [Debtor]
has or ought to have in or to ... [the Property]." Mr. Kujan did not execute a mortgage in favor of the Debtor to secure his payment
of the Obligation to her. As of the Petition Date (which occurred after the date of recordation of the Quitclaim Deed), the Debtor
did not occupy the Property, and had no prospect of occupying the Property in the future in that, under the Stipulation, she does
not have a right to purchase the Property from Mr. Kujan.lfil

II. DISCUSSION
What follows is a two-step analysis substantially similar to that used by the court in In re Lewis, 216 B.R. 644
lBankr.N.D.Okla.1998). The first step in the analysis is to determine whether, as of the Petition Date, the Debtor had an

'\J!9

exemptible interest in the alleged homestead Property itself. If the answer to the first question is "no," the second step in the
analysis is to determine whether the Obligation might constitute proceeds of a homestead which, as of the Petition Date,
themselves were exempt under the applicable homestead exemption. In undertaking the above-described analysis, the court
bears in mind the following:
"(E]xemption laws must be liberally construed in favor of a debtor and/or the debtor's family, so that their purposes
may be properly effectuated. For this reason, no mere technicality should defeat the right of exemption, and
whenever the claim to an exemption can be brought within the purpose and intent of the statute by a fair and
reasonable interpretation, the exemption should be allowed. Thus, statutory language should not be restricted in
its meaning and effect so as to minimize its operation on the beneficent objects of the statutes. Furthermore, when
there is a doubt as to a statute's intent, it should be construed in favor of the debtor, especially in the absence of a

vj

clear legislative statement not to favor the debtor, since the creditor is almost always in a better position to protect
its interest than is a debtor."

Caraq/iorv. World Savings & Loan On re Caraqlior), 251 B.R. 778. 782-83 (Bankr.D.Conn.2000) (citations omitted).
A. Property Qua Property as Exempt
Section 52-352b of the Connecticut General Statutes provides in relevant part as follows: "The following property of any natural
person shall be exempt: ... [t)he homestead of the exemptioner...."Conn.Gen.Stat. Ann.§ 52-352b(t) (West2002).ill
"Homestead" is defined in Section 52-352a of the Connecticut General Statutes in relevant part as follows:" 'Homestead' means
owner-occupied real property ... used as a primary residence." Conn. Gen.Stat. Ann.§ 52-352a(e) (West 2002). Thus, there are
~

three requisites for real property to constitute an individual's statutory homestead. First, the individual must "own[]" the subject
221

real property within the meaning of Section 52-352a as *221 of the relevant time.Ifil Second, the individual must "occup(y)" the
subject real property within the meaning of Section 52-352a as of the relevant time. Third, the subject real property must be "used
as a primary residence" within the meaning of Section 52-352a as of the relevant time. The Debtor argues that, as of the Petition
Date, she had "equitable distribution rights" in the Property and that such constituted a sufficient interest in the Property itself (i.e.,

vJ

Property qua Property) to satisfy the "owner[ship]" requirement of Section 52-352a. The Trustee responds that, as of the Petition
Date, the Debtor had no interest in the Property. For the reasons set forth below, the court agrees with the Trustee.
The short answer to the question of what rights (if any) the Debtor retained in the Property as of the Petition Date is that the
Quitclaim Deed had already been executed, delivered and recorded as of the Petition Date. That is significant because the
Quitclaim Deed conveyed to Mr. Kujan "a// the right, title, interest, claim and demand whatsoever as the ... [Debtor] has or ought

~

to have in or to ... [the Property]." (Trustee's Exhibit B (Quitclaim Deed) (emphasis added). See also Trustee's Exhibit A
(Stipulation) at 1J 7 (''The Wife shall quit claim her interest in and to said property to the Husband.").) Thus, in the wake of the
Quitclaim Deed, the Debtor had no interest in the Property itself, having conveyed it all to Mr. Kujan. See Conn. Gen.Stat. Ann.§
47-36f (West 2002) {"A deed entitled 'Quitclaim Deed', when duly executed, has the force and effect of a conveyance to the
releasee of all the releaser's right, title and interest in and to the property described therein except as otherwise limited therein,

~

but without any covenants of title.").
An alternative analysis leads to the same conclusion as demonstrated by the following. With respect to any "equitable distribution
rights" of the Debtor in respect of the Property, the Superior Court's power to equitably divide marita I property arises under
Section 46b-81 of the Connecticut General Statutes which provides in relevant part as follows:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(a) At the time of entering a decree ... dissolving a marriage ... , the superior court may assign to either the
husband or wife all or any part of the estate of the other. The court may pass title to real property to either party or
to a third person or may order the sale of such real property, without any act by either the husband or the wife,
when in the judgment of the court it is the proper mode to carry the decree into effect.
Conn. Gen.Stat. Ann.§ 46b-81 (a) (West 2002). However, the process of equitable distribution ceases upon entry of a decree. At
that point title to the marital assets is deemed to be "unscramble[d]", McPhee

v. McPhee, 186 Conn. 167,170,440 A.2d 274

(1982} Ifil and the rights of the (former) spouses inter seas to (former) marital property are deemed to have been fully and finally
adjudicated. See Billings
222

v. Billings. 54 Conn.App.142. 148 732 A.2d 814 (1999} ("General Statutes§ 46b-86(a)llfil ... states

that the trial court does *222 not have the authority to modify a property settlement entered into pursuant to§ 46b-81 .... By its
terms, ... [Section 46b-86(a)] deprives the Superior Court of continuing jurisdiction over that portion of a dissolution judgment
providing for the assignment of property of one party to the other party under General Statutes§ 46b-81.") (internal quotation
marks and footnotes omitted). Thus, even if the institution of marital dissolution proceedings creates an "equitable distribution
right" that constitutes a property interest in specific realty under Connecticut law (a point which the court does not decide), entry of
a decree in those proceedings terminates any such right leaving only the rights as they are after adjudication by the Superior
Court. The question then becomes: what were those rights as of the Petition Date?
It is uncontested that the Debtor did not have record title to the Property as of the Petition Date. It also is uncontested that the
Debtor does not have a mortgage in respect of the Property to secure the Obligation. Cf. Jetmore

v. Jetmore, 6 Conn.App. 632,

636, 507 A.2d 116 (1986} (court ordered wife to quit claim her interest in marital property to husband in return for mortgage note
and deed for $25,000.00 payable with interest at seven percent per annum over seven years; "[s]uch encumbrances upon real
~

estate are common and sanctioned ... [by Connecticut Supreme Court case authority]."). The Debtor does not argue that the
Decree and the Stipulation provided for a lien on the Property.l!ll At best, the Decree and the Stipulation might be deemed to
provide for some sort of an assignment to the Debtor of the proceeds of a future sale of the Property. However, even if that were
so (a point which the court does not decide), such an assignment would create an interestin sale proceeds only, not the Property
itself. Accordingly, for all of the reasons stated above, the court concludes that, as of the Petition Date, the Debtor did not "own[]"

~

the Property within the purview of Section 52-352a.llll.
The Debtor relies upon In re McCulley. 150 B.R. 358, to support her claim of exemption here. In McCulley, title to the subject
realty had been solely in the wife's name. Then, divorce proceedings ensued. Subsequently, the husband and wife (not yet
divorced) became joint chapter 7 debtors. A postpetition order was issued in the divorce proceedings awarding a one-half
interest in the subject property to the male debtor. The male debtor sought to exempt that one-half interest in the subject property
in his bankruptcy case pursuant to Bankruptcy Code§ 522(d)(1 ). The female debtor also asserted a Section 522(d)(1) exemption
223

in respect of that *223 property. The court held that, as of the petition date, the male debtor had no interest in the realty itself but
was a mere unsecured creditor in his former wife's case with a claim for the value of the "one-half interest." As such, he was
entitled to share with the female debtor's other unsecured creditors in her estate after giving effect to her valid exemption in
respect of the subject property under Bankruptcy Code § 522(d)(1 ). McCulley. 150 B.R. at 360-61. Further, the McCulley court
ruled (without citation of authority), that

~

[t]o the extent that Richard McCulley benefits from this distribution [from his former wife's estate], it seems
reasonable to conclude that the exemption available to him under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) would ... be available to
him to protect as much as seven thousand five hundred dollars ($7,500.00) before ... [his own] creditors ... are
entitled to share in any part of the Richard McCulley distribution.
McCulley. 150 B.R. at 361.
Since the McCulley court held that, as of the petition date, Mr. McCulley was a mere unsecured creditor in his former wife's
bankruptcy case, McCulley is not helpful to the Debtor in her argument that she had an exemptible interest in the Property itself
as of the Petition Date. To the extent that McCulley stands for the proposition that proceeds of a Section 522(d)(1) "residence" {at
least under certain circumstances) may be exemptible under Bankruptcy Code§ 522(d){1 ), that holding is not dispositive here
because the statutory framework being construed is not Section 522(d)(1) but, rather, the Connecticut homestead exemption.

B. Proceeds of the Property As Exempt
Pursuant to the Briefing Order, the court directed the parties to address the question of whether the Obligation might be exempt
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Order with the Further Briefing. What follows is this court's analysis of the ''proceeds" issue based upon the Further Briefing and
this court's own research.
Neither Section 52-352a nor Section 52-352b expressly address the issue of when (if ever) proceeds of a homestead themselves
might be exempt pursuant to the homestead exemption. The parties have not identified nor has this court located any
Connecticut state or federal court decision(s) which deal directly with that issue. However, the legislative history behind the 1993
enactment of the Connecticut homestead exemption makes clear that proceeds of a voluntary sale of the homestead are not
224

exempt. See An Act Concerning Homestead Exemption for Residential Real Property: Hearing on H.B. *224 5307 Before the
Connecticut General Assembly, 36 H.R. Proc., Pt. 30, 1993 Sess., p. 10848-849 (1993) (statement of Rep. Samowitz) ("Under this
system here, if you owe a debt and you don't pay somebody and ... [that person] goes to court and puts an attachment on your
property and you want to sell your house, you still have a lien on your house so ... in order to release the lien, [you] would have
to pay that off."). Materially similar homestead exemption statutes in other jurisdictions have been so construed. See, e.g., 40
Am.Jur.2d Homestead§ 43 (2002); Drennen v. Wheatle½ 210 Ark. 222, 195 S.W.2d 43 (1946). However, at least some courts
take a more liberal view of the applicability of the homestead exemption to sale proceeds when the sale of the homestead is
deemed to have been forced or involuntary rather than voluntary. See, e.g., 40 C.J.S. Homesteads§ 46 (2002); Exchange Bank

& Trust Co. v. Mathews, 267 Ark. 415, 591 S.W.2d 354, 356 (1979} ("There is no doubt insurance money or proceeds from a
forced sale of a homestead are exempt from execution .... Furthermore, those proceeds are exempt from execution for a
reasonable period of time to allow a person to invest in another homestead."). Courts also have exercised varying degrees of
liberality in construing what constitutes an "involuntary" or "forced" sale (as distinguished from a voluntary sale) for homestead
exemption purposes. See, e.g., 40 C.J.S. Homesteads§ 46.I.lil Compare Obenshain v. Obenshain, 252 Ark. 701,480 S.W.2d
567 (1972} (strictly construing what constitutes an involuntary or forced sale) with In re Cole 93 B.R. 707 (9th Cir. BAP 1988)
~

(liberally construing what constitutes an involuntary or forced sale).
Pursuant to the Briefing Order, the Debtor expressly was given the opportunity to argue that the subject transfer by the Debtor
was involuntary rather than voluntary and that different rules govern proceeds of involuntary (as opposed to voluntary) transfers
under Connecticut homestead exemption law. (See Briefing Order at n. 2.) The Debtor elected not to do that (See Doc. 1.0. Nos.
25, 26.) Accordingly, the Debtor is deemed to have waived that argument. Thus, it is unnecessary for this court to reach the issue
of whether, in appropriate circumstances, the Connecticut courts would hold that proceeds of an involuntary transfer of a
homestead are exempt under the statute, and, if so, whether the Connecticut courts would deem the subject transfer to be
involuntary rather than voluntary and otherwise to satisfy requirements for the exemption. Accordingly, based upon this court's
conclusion set forth above that the Connecticut courts (based on the stated intent of the Legislature) would not construe the
proceeds of a voluntary transfer of a homestead to be exempt, the Objection must be sustained ,llfil

Ill. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, a separate marginal order will enter sustaining the Objection.

ill This matter is a core proceeding within the purview of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b). This memorandum constitutes the findings of fact and conclusions of
law mandated by Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 9014 and 7052.

rn_ 1n the Original Schedules, the Debtor elected her exemptions under Bankruptcy Code§ 522(d). (See Original Schedules, Schedule C.)

In
Amended Schedule C, the Debtor changed her election to her exemptions under Connecticut law. (See Amended Schedule C.) Cf. 11 U.S.C. §

522{b){2).

QI At the Hearing (as defined below), the Trustee indicated that she contests that as a factual matter the Obligation is (in any relevant sense)
proceeds of the Homestead.
~

Pending resolution of the Trustee's Objection, the Trustee has marked the hearing on the Administrative Closure Motion (and the related Debtor
objection) "off' with leave to reclaim.

[fil Trustee's Exhibit A is a certified copy of the Stipulation {the "Stipulation") filed in the Debtor's marital dissolution proceedings, incorporated into
the Decree and filed in the Fairfield town records in respect of the Property. Trustee's Exhibit Bis a certified copy of a quitclaim deed (the "Quitclaim
Deed") from the Debtor to her former husband, dated March 18, 1999 and filed in the Fairfield Town records in respect of the Property.

[fil On the other hand, under the Stipulation Mr. Kujan can avoid having to sell the Property (which he otherwise is required to do when the couple's
son reaches 18 years of age) by satisfying the Obligation from sources other than Property sale proceeds. (See Stipulation

1J 7.)

(Zl "' Exempt' means, unless otherwise specified, not subject to any form of process or court order for the purpose of debt collection ...." Conn.
Gen.Stat. Ann.§ 52-352a(c) (West 2002).
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[fil Here, the relevant date for all questions is the Petition Date. See Armstrong v. Peterson (In re Peterson) 897 F.2d 935 938 (8th Cir.1990) ("
[The debtor's) ... entitlement to a homestead exemption is ... examined under the facts as they existed on ... (the date the petition was filed).").
[fil "The purpose of property division [on divorce) ... is to unscramble the ownership of property, giving to each spouse what is equitably his." Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).

llQl Section 46b-86 of the Connecticut General Statutes provides in pertinent part:
(a) Unless and to the extent that the decree precludes modification, ... any final order for the periodic payment of permanent alimony or support or
an order for alimony or support pendente lite may at any time thereafter be continued, set aside, altered or modified by said court upon a showing
of a substantial change in the circumstances of either party.... This section shall not apply to assignments under section 46b-81 or to any
assignment of the estate or a portion thereof of one party to the other party under prior law.
Conn. Gen.Stat. Ann.§ 46b-86(a) (West 2002) (emphasis added).

I11l Such an argument arguably would be unavailing in any event. See In re Lewis, 216 B.R. at 647 n. 1 (citing White v.

White (In re White), 727
F.2d 884 (9th Cir.1984), for the proposition that "a lien ... [is] not a sufficient ownership interest to constitute [a] homestead under Oregon (and
Oklahoma] law.").

~

Because the court concludes that, as of the Petition Date, the Debtor had no interest in the Property itself, it is unnecessary for the court to
determine what minimum quantum of interest in realty is necessary to satisfy the statutory requirement of "owner(ship)."

[1fil The court will assume (for present purposes only) that the Property was the Debtor's statutory homestead immediately prior to the time at
which she was divested of her interest in the Property pursuant to the Decree. Compare Connecticut Nat'/ Bank N.A. v. Harding, No. CV 920291955, 1994 WL 174676 (Conn.Super.Ct. Jan.10, 1994) (proceeds from the sale of real property not exempt under Connecticut homestead
exemption because the subject real property itself was not a statutory homestead at time of sale (or any other time); "[w]hat now exists and has
existed since well before the effective date (of the 1993 homestead exemption statute] ... is a bank account, not a piece of real estate.") (emphasis
added) with In re Lewis, 216 B.R. at 647-48 (in the absence of proof of intent to abandon, court concluded that (even though the debtor was living
elsewhere as a consequence of marital discord at the time of entry of such decree) the subject property was the debtor's homestead immediately
before the debtor's interest in the same was awarded to his wife in divorce proceedings).
~

The rule as to ... [forced or involuntary) sales, with its limitations, has been applied to money paid by way of damages awarded in
condemnation proceedings for a right of way over the homestead premises, to the proceeds of a sale under foreclosure of a mortgage or deed of
trust of the homestead premises, to the proceeds of a partition sale of the homestead premises, and to proceeds realized from the sale or
involuntary transfer of a homestead pursuant to a divorce decree.
Id. (footnotes omitted).

I1fil The court has considered the Debtor's other arguments and finds them unpersuasive.

Save trees - read court opinions online on Google Scholar.
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Stucki v. Ellis, 201 P.2d 486 (Utah 1949)
Utah Supreme Court
Filed: January 4th, 1949
Precedential Status: Precedential
Citations: 201 P.2d 486, 114 Utah 486
Docket Number: No. 7200.
Judges: LATIMER, Justice.
Nature of suit: Unknown

I,,@

This is an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien. From a judgment for the plaintiff, one of the defendants, Thomas A.
Tarbet, has appealed. We shall refer to the parties as they appeared below.
On October 16, 1945, defendant June S. Spackman, as owner of the premises in question, entered into a written
contract with defendant James Ellis, whereby Mrs. Spackman agreed to sell and Mr. Ellis agreed to buy a small home
in Logan, Utah. Under the agreement, Mr. Ellis made a down payment of four hundred dollars and agreed to pay the
remaining six hundred dollars at the rate of ten dollars per month. Mr. Ellis, with his wife and children went into
possession of the premises under this contract, but never acquired record title as this was retained by Mrs.
Spackman until she and her husband deeded the premises to defendant Thomas A. Tarbet on March 1, 1946.
Shortly after defendant Ellis went into possession, the home was partially destroyed by fire. When he first attempted
to engage the plaintiff to repair the damage that had been done, plaintiff declined. Some time in December, 1946, Mr.
Ellis again approached the plaintiff stating that he had been turned down by others, that he was in dire need of having
the work done, and that there was sufficient insurance on the house to pay for the repairs. Plaintiff testified that he
then sent his foreman, Roy Earl, with Mr. Ellis to the office of defendant W.T. Stewart, a real estate agent who had
handled the contract between Mrs. Spackman and Mr. Ellis, to investigate whether there was insurance to cover the
cost of repairs. Roy Earl testified that upon arriving in Mr. Stewart's office Mr. Ellis explained to Mr. Stewart that he
had no money to pay for the work to be done but understood the home was protected by fire insurance; and that Mr.
Stewart's reply was that the premises were protected by insurance and that he would be glad to pay the bill for the
repairs as soon as the work ·-Page 489was completed. Mr. Stewart flatly denied having had this conversation and
further testified he had not become acquainted with Roy Earl until about February 15, 1946, at which time Mr. Earl
and the plaintiff came to see him after he, Mr. Stewart, had refused to pay plaintiff's bill for the repairs.
On or about February 17, 1946, plaintiff attempted to contact Mr. Ellis regarding the matter but was unable to find any
trace of him, and his whereabouts continued to remain unknown to the plaintiff from that time forward.
On February 25, 1946, defendant Ellis entered into a written contract with defendant Tarbet for the sale of Ellis'
interest in the property. This agreement was made with the consent of the Spackmans, who still held the record title.
As part of this transaction and on March 1, 1946, June S. Spackman and her husband Clare Spackman executed a
warranty deed conveying the premises to defendant Thomas A. Tarbet for the sum of fifteen hundred dollars. The
contract of purchase included the interests of Ellis and the Spackmans and the consideration paid was divided
according to their respective interests. On March 15, 1946, plaintiff filed his notice of mechanic's lien as provided by
statute. On March 23, 1946, Thomas A. Tarbet was married.
The court below entered a non-suit as against W.H. Stewart, but awarded a judgment foreclosing the mechanic's lien.

vi

Thomas A. Tarbet, the present owner, has appealed contending the judgment is erroneous for two reasons: (1) A
mechanic's lien filed upon the premises when occupied by James Ellis would have been void inasmuch as the
homestead exemption he could have asserted would preclude a foreclosure of the lien and under 38-0-2, U.C.A.
1943, Ellis' exemption runs with the transfer of the property to Tarbet. (2) Defendant Tarbet was a "head of a family"

V,
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within the meaning of 38-0-5, U.C.A. 1943, at the time the mechanic's lien attached to the property and as such is
able to assert a homestead exemption in his own right. '"Page 490
Plaintiff makes a cross-assignment of error contending the court below erred in granting a non-suit as to defendant
Stewart. We do not pass upon this question because it is not before us in this appeal as no final judgment has been 1
entered as to defendant Stewart. See Watson v.Ode/1, 53 Utah 96, 176 P. 619. Furthermore, the notice of crossappeal is insufficient to identify with certainty any appealable order or judgment.
A statement concerning the manner and method of acquiring a homestead is appropriate here inasmuch as the
plaintiff has argued that property becomes a homestead only after one entitled to assert a homestead exemption
takes affirmative action to select or designate the property to be exempted; that the statute does not set up the
homestead exemption against a mechanic's lien as it does against judgment liens; and, that a mechanic's lien is a
lien on property which can only be defeated by affirmatively setting up the homestead claim.
Section 38-0-1, U.C.A. 1943, creates the homestead exemption in the following language:
"A homestead consisting of lands, appurtenances and improvements, which lands may be in one or more localities,
not exceeding in value with the appurtenances and improvements thereon the sum of $2,000 for the head of the
family, and the further sum of $750 for the spouse, and $300 for each other member of the family, shall be exempt
from judgment lien and from execution or forced sale, except upon the following obligations: ( 1) taxes accruing and
levied thereon; and (2) judgments obtained on debts secured by lawful mortgage on the premises and on debts
created for the purchase price thereof."
Under the statute the lands consisting of the homestead are exempt from (1) Judgment lien and (2) execution or
forced sale, and under our ruling in Volker-Scowcroft Lumber Co. v. Vance, 32 Utah 74, 88 P. 896, 125 Am. St. Rep.
2 828, a homestead is exempt from judgment and foreclosure of a mechani's lien by virtue of section 1, article 22, of
the Constitution of this state. ·Page 491
~

Concerning whether the homestead exemption depends upon whether the homestead claimant has taken some
affirmative action to designate or select it, we refer first to the case ofKimba/1 v. Salisbury, 19 Utah 161, 56 P. 973. In
that case, this court held that under the statute of 1896 which granted a homestead exemption upon lands and
appurtenances to be selected by the judgment debtor, that the statute did not require the judgment debtor to formally
select the premises he was using for his residence as a homestead, but that the selection of the homestead was
sufficiently manifest by the fact of ownership, residence, use or occupation. In 1898 the legislature enacted into law
Section 1149, which provided:
"Any person who is the head of a family may make a declaration of homestead in the manner provided in the next two
sections, but a failure to make such declaration shall not impair the homestead right." Rev. St. 1898, § 1149.
In Daniels v. Smith, 51 Utah 144, 169 P. 267, this court held that under that statute the making and recording of a
declaration of homestead is only important when the homestead is incumbered or conveyed by a married person who
holds the title thereof without the consent of his spouse as provided in Section 1155, Comp. Laws 1907, and as
pointed out in Nielson v.Peterson, 30 Utah 391, 85 P. 429, and that in all other cases a failure to declare the
homestead shall not impair the homestead right. In the Nielson v. Peterson case, supra, defendant Peterson
mortgaged premises claimed by himself and his wife as their homestead to plaintiff Nielson, who later brought suit to
foreclose the mortgage after Peterson had defaulted in the payment of his indebtedness. On his failure to appear or
answer, the court entered a default against Peterson, but his wife, who had not joined in the execution of the
mortgage filed a complaint in intervention, alleging that the mortgaged premises were her home, were exempt as
such, and that the mortgage executed by her husband was void under Section 1155, Comp. Laws 1907, because she
had not joined in its execution. This court "Page 492 there held that under Section 1155, which in substance provided
that if an owner is married he may not convey or incumber or contract to convey or incumber the premises selected
and recorded as a homestead prior to the time of such conveyance, incumbrance, or contract unless both spouses
join in its execution, the fact that there was no declaration of homestead prior to the time Peterson executed the
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mortgage to Nielson would preclude his wife from taking advantage of the homestead that could otherwise be
asserted.
~

Section 1149, Comp. Laws of 1907, is in substance identical with 38-0-10, U.C.A. 1943, which is the statute under
which the rights and obligations of the present litigants are to be determined. Under this latter statute and our
decisions in the foregoing cases, the homestead exemption exists 3 independently of whether the claimant has made
a formal declaration of his exemption except under the facts of the Peterson case. By purchasing, occupying and
using the premises as a home for himself and family, Ellis sufficiently manifested that the property involved was his
homestead. For other cases dealing with this subject see citations given in Panagopu/os v.Manning, 93 Utah 198, 69
P.2d 614.
Section 38-0-2, U.C.A. 1943, is relied upon by defendant Tarbet to preserve the homestead exemption upon transfer
by the judgment creditor. This section provides as follows:
'When a homestead is conveyed by the owner thereof such conveyance shall not subject the premises to any lien or

\jp

encumbrance to which it would not be subject in the hands of the owner; and the proceeds of the sale thereof, to the
amount of the exemption existing at the time of sale, shall be exempt from execution or other process for one year
after the receipt thereof by the person entitled to the exemption."
Defendant Ellis was entitled to assert a homestead exemption against plaintiffs mechanic's lien and if he conveyed
the premises to defendant Tarbet, within the meaning *Page 493 of this section, then plaintiff's lien cannot be
foreclosed against the premises. It will be noted that 4 the statute refers to a conveyance of the homestead by the
owner. The facts concerning whether Mr. Ellis could qualify as an owner are that he purchased the premises from the
Spackmans under a written contract, which at the time of the sale to Tarbet was recognized by Spackmans as being
valid and enforceable. He and his family were occupying the premises as a home so that plaintiff had notice that Ellis
had an interest in the premises even though not of record. The facts establish an equitable interest in Ellis and that an

VP

equitable owner of land is entitled to assert a homestead exemption was our ruling in Hansen v.Mauss, 40 Utah
361,121 P. 605. That decision coincides with the prevailing rule in this country. (See the annotation in 89 A.LR. 531.)
The remaining question is whether defendant Ellis "conveyed" the premises to defendant Tarbet so that he, Tarbet is
now entitled to rely upon 38-0-2, U.C.A. 1943, to defeat plaintiff's mechanic's lien. In attempting to determine whether
there was a conveyance of the premises by Ellis to Tarbet within the meaning of the law, we turn to 78-1-1, U.C.A.

v)

1943, for a definition of the term "conveyance" as applied to real property in this jurisdiction. That statute reads as
follows:
"The term ·conveyance' as used in this title shall be construed to embrace every instrument in writing by which any
real estate, or interest in real estate, is created, aliened, mortgaged, encumbered or assigned, except wills, and
leases for a term not exceeding one year."
The best method Mr. Ellis could have used in conveying his interest in the premises to defendant Tarbet would have
been by deed. But under our broad statutory definition of the term "conveyance," an interest in real property may be
conveyed without the use of a deed. Defendant Tarbet's exhibit 1, which is a written instrument prepared and used by
the Stewart Real Estate Company, and signed by Mr. Ellis, reads as follows: *Page 494

"Logan, Utah, Feb. 25, 1946
"Received of Thos. A. Tarbet the sum of eight hundred dollars
as a deposit on the purchase of James Ellis property at #459 west
Center St., Logan, Utah.
"The agreed purchase price is fifteen hundred dollars, payable
on the following terms: the balance to be paid as follows: by
assuming mortgage or contract for $700.00 payable four years
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after date.
11

SUBJECT TO APPROVAL OF
THE OWNER

agree to above:
"Thomas A. Tarbet

STEWART REAL ESTATE CO.

"I

By W.T. Stewart
~

"Purchaser

(signed)

(signed)

"I agree to above:

"James c. Ellis

"owner

(signed)"

We hold that the above instrument, when considered in connection with full payment by Tarbet to both the equitable
and legal owner, together with a warranty deed executed by the legal owner, is sufficient to convey and transfer 5
both interests and that Section 78-1-1, U.C.A. 1943, protects the homestead exemption in the hands of the
purchaser.
Our ruling sustaining defendant's first assignment of error makes a decision on the second question unnecessary.
The judgment foreclosing plaintiffs mechanic's lien is reversed. Costs to appellant.
PRATT, C.J., and WADE and McDONOUGH, JJ., concur.
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THE CODE OF LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA
TITLE I-GENERAL PROVISIONS
This title was enacted by act July 30, 1947, ch. 388, § 1, 61 Stat. 633

Rules of construction ....................... ..
Acts and resolutions; formalities of
enactment; repeals; sealing of instruments .......................................... .
Code of Laws of United States and
Supplements; District of Columbia Code and Supplements ......... ..

1.

2.
3.

vJ

1

Title 1

101

Sections

Former

Revised Statutes
Statutes at Large

201

30a ........ .
31 ·····•··•··
51a ........ .
52 .......... .

R.S .. §908 .................................................... .
R.S., §6 ....................................................... .
Mar. 2, 1929. ch. 586, §1, 45 Stat. 1540 ......... ..
May 29, 1928, ch. 910. § 2, 45 Stat. 1007 ........ ..
Mar. 2, 1929, ch. 586, §2, 45 Stat. 1541.
May 29, 1928, ch. 910. §3. 45 Stat. 1007 •.........
May 29, 1928, ch. 910. §4. 45 Stat. 1007 ......... .
Mar.2.1929. ch. 586, §3, 45 Stat. 1541.
Mar. 2, 1929. ch. 586, §4, 45 Stat. 1542 .......... .
Mar. 4, 1933. ch. 282, § 1, 47 Stat. 1603.
June 13, 1934, ch. 483, §§ 1, 2, 48 Stat. 948.
Mar. 2, 1929, ch. 586, §5, 45 Stat. 1542 .......... .
Mar. 4, 1933. ch. 282, §1. 47 Stat. 1603.
June 13, 1934, ch. 483, §§ 1, 2, 48 Stat. 948.
Mar. 2, 1929, ch. 586, §6, 45 Stat. 1542 .......... .
Mar. 2, 1929. ch. 586, §7, 45 Stat. 1542 ......... ..
May 29, 1928, ch. 910, §5, 45 Stat. 1007 ......... .
May 29, 1928, ch. 910, §6, 45 Stat. 1007 ........ ..
May 29, 1928, ch. 910, §7. 45 Stat. 1008 ........ ..
May 29, 1928, ch. 910, §8. 45 Stat. 1008 ......... .
May 29, 1928, ch. 910, § 10, 45 Stat. 1008 ........ .
Mar. 3, 1933. ch. 202, §2, 47 Stat. 1431 .......... .

POSITrYE LAW; CITATION
This title has been made positive law by section 1 of
act July 30, 1947, ch. 388, 61 Stat. 633, which provided in
part that: "Title 1 of the United States Code entitled
'General Provisions', is codified and enacted into positive law and may be cited as 'l U.S. C., §--.'"
REPEALS
Section 2 of act July 30, 1947, provided that the sections or parts thereof of the Statutes at Large or the
Revised Statutes covering provisions codified in this
Act are repealed insofar as the provisions appeared in
former Title 1, and provided that any rights or liabilities now existing under the repealed sections or parts
thereof shall not be affected by the repeal.
WRITS OF ERROR
Section 23 of act June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 990,
provided that: "All Acts of Congress referring to writs
of error shall be construed as amended to the extent
necessary to substitute appeal for writ of error."

Title I

Revised Statutes
Statutes at Large

Former

Sections
1 ........... .
2 ........... .
3 .......... ..

4 .......... ..
5 .......... ..
6 .......... ..

v.tP

21
22
23
24
25
26

.......... .
......... ..
.......... .
.......... .
.......... .
.......... .

27 ......... ..

28 .......... .
29 .......... .

R.S .•
R.S .•
R.S.,
R.S ..
R.S.,
June
R.S .•
R.S ..
R.S .•
R.S ..

§1 ....................................................... .
§2 ....................................................... .
§3 ....................................................... .
§4 ....................................................... .
§5 ....................................................... .
11, 1940, ch. 325, § 1, 54 Stat. 305 .......... .
§7 ....................................................... .
§8 ....................................................... .
§9 ....................................................... .
§10 ..................................................... .
R.S., §11 ..................................................... .
Nov. 1, 1893, 28 Stat. App. 5 ........................ .
Mar. 2, 1895, ch. 177, §1. 28 Stat. 769.
Mar. 6, 1920, ch. 94. § 1. 41 Stat. 520 ............. .
R.S .• §12 ..................................................... .
R.S .. §13 ..................................................... .
Mar. 22, 1944. ch. 123, 58 Stat. 118.

29a ....... .. R.S .. §5599 .................................................. .
29b ........ . Mar. 3, 1933, ch. 202, §3, 47 Stat. 1431 ......... ..
30 .......... . Jan. 12, 1895, ch. 23, §73, 28 Stat. 615 ........... .
June 20, 1936, ch. 630, §9, 49 Stat. 1551.
June 16, 1938, ch. 477, § 1. 52 Stat. 760.

53 ···········
54 .......... .
54a ........ .

541> ·········
54c ........•
54d ........ .
55 ···········
56 ···········
57 .......... .
58 ......... ..
59 .......... .
60 .......... .

New

1
2
3
4
5

6

101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

110
111
112

New

113
114
201
202
203
204
205
206

207
208
209
210
211
212
213
Rep.

Words denoting number, gender, etc. 1
'"County" as including "parish", etc. 1
'·Vessel" as including all means of water
transportation.
"Vehicle" as including all means of land
transportation.
"Company" or "association" as including
successors and assigns.
Limitation of term "products of American
fisheries."
Definition of "marriage" and "spouse".
"Person·•, "human being", "child", and "individual" as including born-alive infant.

4.

Titlel

Sections

Title I

Sections

CHAPTER I-RULES OF CONSTRUCTION
Sec.
1.

2.
3.

TABLE SHOWING DISPOSITION OF ALL SECTIONS OF
FORMER TITLE 1

l.(iJ

TABLE SHOWING DISPOSITION OF ALL SECTIONS OF
FORMER TITLE 1-Continued

Sec.

Chap.

5.

6.
7.
8.

AMENDMENTS
2002-Pub. L. 107-207, §2(b), Aug. 5, 2002, 116 Stat. 926,
added i tern 8.
1996-Puh. L. 104-199, §3(b), Sept. 21, 1996, 110 Stat.
2420, added item 7.
§ 1.

Words denoting number, gender, and so forth

In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise1 So

In original. Does not conform to section catch line.
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§1

TITLE !-GENERAL PROVISIONS

words importing the singular include and
apply to several persons, parties, or things;
words importing the plural include the singular;
words importing the masculine gender include the feminine as well;
words used in the present tense include the
future as well as the present:
the words "insane" and ''insane person" and
"lunatic" shall include every idiot, lunatic,
insane person, and person non compos mentis;
the words "person" and "whoever" include
corporations, companies, associations, firms,
partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals;
"officer'' includes any person authorized by
law to perform the duties of the office;
"signature" or "subscription" includes a
mark when the person making the same intended it as such;
"oath'' includes affirmation, and "sworn"
includes affirmed;
"writing" includes printing and typewriting
and reproductions of visual symbols by photographing,
multigraphing,
mimeographing,
manifolding, or otherwise.
(July 30, 1947, ch. 388, 61 Stat. 633; June 25, 1948,
ch. 645, § 6, 62 Stat. 859; Oct. 31, 1951, ch. 655, § 1,
65 Stat. 710.)
AMENDME:-ITS

1951-Act Oct. 31, 1951, substituted, in fourth clause
after opening clause, "used" for "use".
1948-Act June 25, 1948, included "tense", "whoever",
••signature", "subscription", "writing" and a broader
definition of "person".
SHORT TITLE OF 2002 AMENDMENT

Pub. L. 107-207, § 1, Aug. 5, 2002, 116 Stat. 926, provided
that: "This Act [enacting section 8 of this title) may be
cited as the 'Born-Alive Infants Protection Act of
2002'."

SHORT TITLE OF 1996 AMENDMENT
Pub. L. 104-199, § 1, Sept. 21, 1996, 110 Stat. 2419, provided that: "This Act [enacting section 7 of this title
and section 1738C of Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial
Procedure) may be cited as the 'Defense of Marriage
Act'."

Page 2

erence to ·this Act' contained in any division of this
Act [American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009,
see Tables for classification] shall be treated as referring only to the provisions of that division."
REFERENCES

IN

PUB. L. 110-329

Pub. L. 110-329, §3, Sept. 30, 2008, 122 Stat. 3574, provided that: "Except as expressly provided otherwise,
any reference to 'this Act' or 'this joint resolution'
contained in any division of this Act [Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, see Tables for classification) shall be
treated as referring only to the provisions of that division."
REFERENCES IN PUB. L. 110-161

Pub. L. 110-161, §3, Dec. 26, 2007, 121 Stat. 1845, provided that: "Except as expressly provided otherwise,
any reference to 'this Act' contained in any division of
this Act [Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, see
Tables for classification) shall be treated as referring
only to the provisions of that division."
REFERENCES IN PUB. L. 110-116

Pub. L. 110-116, §2, Nov. 13, 2007, 121 Stat. 1295, provided that: "Except as expressly provided otherwise,
any reference to 'this Act' contained in any division of
this Act [see Tables for classification] shall be treated
as referencing only to the provisions of that division."
REFERENCES IN PUB. L. 109-289

Pub. L. 109-289, div. A, title VIII, §8112, Sept. 29, 2006,
120 Stat. 1299, provided that: "Except as expressly provided otherwise, any reference to 'this Act' contained
in this division [Department of Defense Appropriations
Act, 2007, see Tables for classification) shall be referring only to the provisions of this division."
REFERENCES

IN

PUB. L. 109-148

Pub. L. 109-148, div. B, title V, §5002, Dec. 30, 2005, 119
Stat. 2813, provided that: "Except as expressly provided
otherwise, any reference to 'this Act' contained in either division A [Department of Defense Appropriations
Act, 2006, see Tables for classification] or division B
[Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico and Pandemic
Influenza, 2006, see Tables for classification) shall be
treated as referring only to the provisions of that division."
REFERENCES IN PUB. L. 109-115

REFERENCES IN PUB. L. 111-118
Pub. L. 111-118, § 3, Dec. 19, 2009, 123 Stat. 3409, provided that: "Except as expressly provided otherwise,
any reference to 'this Act' contained in any division of
this Act [Department of Defense Appropriations Act,
2010, see Tables for classification] shall be treated as
referring only to the provisions of that division.·•

Pub. L. 109-115, div. A, title VIII, §847, Nov. 30, 2005,
119 Stat. 2507, provided that: •·Except as expressly provided otherwise, any reference to 'this Act' contained
in this division [Transportation, Treasury, Housing and
Urban Development, the Judiciary, and Independent
Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, see Tables for classification) shall be treated as referring only to the provisions of this division."

REFERENCES IN PUB. L. 111-117
Pub. L. 111-117, §3, Dec. 16, 2009, 123 Stat. 3035, provided that: "Except as expressly provided otherwise,
any reference to 'this Act' contained in any division of
this Act [Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, see
Tables for classification] shall be treated as referring
only to the provisions of that division."

Pub. L. 108-447, § 3, Dec. 8, 2004, 118 Stat. 2810, provided
that: "Except as expressly provided otherwise, any reference to 'this Act' contained in any division of this
Act [Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, see Tables
for classification] shall be treated as referring only to
the provisions of that division."

REFERENCES IN PUB. L. 111-8
Pub. L. 111-8, §3, Mar. 11, 2009, 123 Stat. 525, provided
that: "Except as expressly provided otherwise, any reference to 'this Act' contained in any division of this
Act [Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, see Tables for
classification) shall be treated as referring only to the
provisions of that division."

Pub. L. 108-199, §3, Jan. 23, 2004, 118 Stat. 4, provided
that: "Except as expressly provided otherwise, any reference to 'this Act' contained in any division of this
Act [Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, see Tables
for classification) shall be treated as referring only to
the provisions of that division."

REFERENCES IN PUB. L. 111-5
Pub. L. 111-5, §4, Feb. 17, 2009, 123 Stat. 116, provided
that: "Except as expressly provided otherwise, any ref-

Pub. L. 108-7, §3, Feb. 20, 2003, 117 Stat. 12, provided
that: "Except as expressly provided otherwise, any ref-

REFERENCES IN PUB. L. 108-447

REFERENCES

IN

PUB. L. 108-199

REFERENCES IN PUB. L. 108-7
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TITLE !-GENERAL PROVISIONS

erence to ·this Act' contained In any division of this
joint resolution [Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, see Tables for classification] shall be treated
as referring only to the provisions of that division.··
CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

Section 48 of Pub. L. 86-70, June 25, 1959, 73 Stat. 154,
provided that: "Whenever the phrase 'continental
United States' is used in any law of the United States
enacted after the date of enactment of this Act [June
25, 1959), it shall mean the 49 States on the North American Continent and the District of Columbia, unless
otherwise expressly provided."
§ 2.

"County" as including "parish", and so forth

The word "county'' includes a parish, or any
other equivalent subdivision of a State or Territory of the United States.
(July 30, 1947, ch. 388, 61 Stat. 633.)
§ 3.

''Vessel" as including all means of water
transportation

The word "vessel" includes every description
of watercraft or other artificial contrivance
used, or capable of being used, as a means of
transportation on water.
(July 30, 1947, ch. 388, 61 Stat. 633.)
§ 4.

''Vehicle" as including all means of land
transportation

The word •·vehicle" includes every description
of carriage or other artificial contrivance used,
or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on land.
(July 30, 1947, ch. 388, 61 Stat. 633.)
§ 5.

"Company" or "association" as including successors and assigns

The word "company" or "association". when
used in reference to a corporation, shall be
deemed to embrace the words "successors and
assigns of such company or association", in like
manner as if these last-named words, or words of
similar import, were expressed.
(July 30, 1947, ch. 388, 61 Stat. 633.)
§ 6. Limitation of term "products of American

fisheries"

Wherever, in the statutes of the United States
or in the rulings, regulations, or interpretations
of various administrative bureaus and agencies
of the United States there appears or may appear the term "products of American fisheries"
said term shall not include fresh or frozen fish
fillets, fresh or frozen fish steaks, or fresh or
frozen slices of fish substantially free of bone
(including any of the foregoing divided in to sections), produced in a foreign country or its territorial waters, in whole or in part with the use of
the labor of persons who are not residents of the
United States.
(July 30, 1947, ch. 388, 61 Stat. 634.)
§ 7.

~

riage" means only a legal union between one
man and one woman as husband and wife, and
the word •·spouse" refers only to a person of the
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.
(Added Pub. L. 104-199, §3(a), Sept. 21, 1996, 110
Stat. 2419.)
§ 8.

"Person", "human being", "child", and "individual" as including born-alive infant
(a) In determining the meaning of any Act of
Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus
and agencies of the United States, the words
•·person", "human being", "child", and "individual", shall include every infant member of
the species homo sapiens who is born alive at
any stage of development.
(b) As used in this section, the term "born
alive", with respect to a member of the species
homo sapiens, means the complete expulsion or
extraction from his or her mother of that member, at any stage of development, who after such
expulsion or extraction breathes or has a beating heart, pulsation of the umbilical cord, or
definite movement of voluntary muscles, regardless of whether the umbilical cord has been cut,
and regardless of whether the expulsion or extraction occurs as a result of natural or induced
labor, cesarean section, or induced abortion.
(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed
to affirm, deny, expand, or contract any legal
status or legal right applicable to any member
of the species homo sapiens at any point prior to
being "born alive" as defined in this section.
(Added Pub. L. 107-207, §2(a), Aug. 5, 2002, 116
Stat. 926.)

CHAPTER 2-ACTS AND RESOLUTIONS; FORMALmES OF ENACTMENT; REPEALS;
SEALING OF INSTRUMENTS
Sec.

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
106a.
106b.
107.
108.
109.
110.
lll.

112.
112a.
112b.
113.

114.

Definition of "marriage" and "spouse"

In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and
agencies of the United States, the word "mar-

§8

Enacting clause.
Resolving clause.
Enacting or resolving words after first section.
Numbering of sections; single proposition.
Title of appropriation Acts.
Printing bills and joint resolutions.
Promulgation of laws.
Amendments to Constitution.
Parchment or paper for printing enrolled bills
or resolutions.
Repeal of repealing act.
Repeal of statutes as affecting existing liabilities.
Saving clause of Revised Statutes.
Repeals as evidence of prior effectiveness.
Statutes at Large; contents; admissibility in
evidence.
United States Treaties and Other International Agreements; contents; admissibility in evidence.
United States international agreements;
transmission to Congress.
"Little and Brown's" edition of laws and
treaties; slip laws; Treaties and Other International Act 1 Series: admissi b111 ty in evidence.
Sealing of instruments.
AMENDMENTS

1972-Pub. L. 92-403, §2, Aug. 22, 1972, 86 Stat. 619,
added item 112b.
1 So

In original. Does not conform to section catchline.
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Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, affidavits, and other papers; representations to court; sanctions.
(a) Signature.
(a)(1) Every pleading, written motion, and other paper must be signed by at least one attorney of record, or, if the
party is not represented, by the party.
(a)(2) A person may sign a paper using any fonn of signature recognized by law as binding. Unless required by
statute, a paper need not be accompanied by affidavit or have a notarized, verified or acknowledged signature. If a rule
requires an affidavit or a notarized, verified or acknowledged signature, the person may submit a declaration pursuant to
Utah Code Section 788-5-705. If an affidavit or a paper with a notarized, verified or acknowledged signature is filed, the
party must comply with Rule

filO.

(a)(3) An unsigned paper will be stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being called to
the attention of the attorney or party.

(b) Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper to the court (whether by signing,
filing, submitting, or advocating), an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,
~

(b)(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(b)(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
{b)(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely
to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(b)(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably
based on a lack of infonnation or belief.

(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court detennines that paragraph (b) has been
violated, the court may, subject to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law
firms, or parties that have violated paragraph (b) or are responsible for the violation.

(c)(1) How initiated.
(c)(1)(A) By motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule must be made separately from other motions or
requests and must describe the specific conduct alleged to violate paragraph_(b). It must be served as provided in
Rule §, but may not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion {or
such other period as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial
is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on the motion
the reasonable expenses and attorney fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. In appropriate
circumstances, a law finn may be held jointly responsible for violations committed by its partners, members, and
employees.

{c)(1)(B) On court's initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an order describing the specific
conduct that appears to violate paragraph (b) and directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has
not violated paragraph (b) with respect thereto.

(c)(2) Nature of sanction; limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of this rule must be limited to what is
sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the
limitations in paragraphs (c)(2)(A) and (c)(2)(8), the sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary
nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order
directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorney fees and other expenses incurred as a direct

vi

result of the violation.
(c)(2)(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party for a violation of paragraph (b)(2).
{c)(2)(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative unless the court issues its order to
show cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims made by or against the party which is, or
whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned.

'-riP
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(c)(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court will describe the conduct determined to constitute a violation of
this rule and explain the basis for the sanction imposed.
Advisory Committee Notes
Effective May 1, 2016
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HURT
Hurt. In such phrases as ..to the hurt or annoyance of

another," or ..hurt, molested, or restrained in his
person or estate," this word is not restricted to physical injuries, but includes also mental pain, as well as
discomfort or annoyance. See also Damage; Injury.
Hurto I (h)urtow I. In Spanish law, theft

and cry.
H.V. An abbreviation for hoc verbo or hac voce, this

living. The correlative of "wife."
Etymologically, the word signified the "house
bond;" the man who, according to Saxon ideas and
institutions, held around him the family, for whom he
was in law responsible.

word, under this word; used references to dictionaries and other works alphabetically arranged.

A farmer, a cultivator or tiller of the
ground. The word "farmer" is colloquially used as
synonymous with "husbandman", but originally
meant a tenant who cultivates leased ground.

Husband of a ship. See Ship (Ship's husband).
Husbanclria /haz~ndriy;/.

In old English law, hus-

bandry.
Agriculture; farming; cultivation of the
soil for food. Farming, in the sense of operating land
to raise crops and livestock. State ex rel. Boynton v.
Wheat Farming Co., 137 Kan. 697, 22 P.2d 1093.
Care of household. Careful management of resources.

Husbandry.

Husband-wire privilege. Term refers to privilege ex-

tended to confidential marital communications.
While state statutes vary, in general such provide
that a spouse has a privilege to ref use to disclose, and
to prevent the other from disclosing, a confidential
communication made while spouses were married
There are certain exceptions to this privilege, the
major one being where one spouse is the victim of a
crime by the other.
The common law rule,
carried forward by statute in many states, prohibits
tort actions between spouses. The current trend
however is to abolish this interspousal immunity doctrine, thus permitting such suits between spouses.
Some states have abolished the doctrine only insofar
as automobile tort actions.

Husband-wife tort actions.

Husbrec /hliwsbreyk/.

In Saxon law, the crime of
housebreaking or burglary.

Huscarle /huwskarl/. In old English law, a house serv-

ant or domestic; a man of the household. A king's
vassal, thane, or baron; an earl's man or vassal.
Husfastne /huwsfa:s(t);n/.

He who holds house and

land.
rent; or a tax or tribute laid upon a house.
A colloquial expression to designate a
bribe to hinder information; pay to secure silence.

Hush-money.

Council; court; tribunal. Apparently so
called from being held within a building, at a time
when other courts were held in the open air. It was a
local court. The county court in the city of London
bore this name. There were hustings at York, Winchester, Lincoln, and in other places similar to the

Hustings.

Term refers to type of actions
where the right to be enforced is several but the
object of the action ls the adjudication of claims
which do or may affect specific property in the action. Eastham v. Public Emp. Retirement Ass'n Bd.,
89 N.M. 399,553 P.2d 679,682.

Hybrid class action.

Hybrid security. Type of security which, in the form of

a debenture, contains elements of indebtedness and
elements of equity stock. J. S. Biritz Const. Co. v. C.
I. R., C.A.Mo., 387 F.2d 451, 455.
Hypnotism. The act of inducing artificially a state of

sleep or trance in a subject by means of verbal
suggestion by the hypnotist or by the subject's concentration upon some object. It is generally characterized by extreme responsiveness to suggestions
from the hypnotist.
Hypobolum /h;pob;l;m/. In the civil law, the name of

the bequest or legacy given by the husband to his
wife, at his death, above her dowry.
Hypochondria; hypomanla /hayp;k6ndriy;, hip;• thayp;meyn(i)y;, hip;• I. See Insanity.
Hypotheca /ha~iyk;, hip;• 1.

"Hypotheca" was a
term of the Roman law, and denoted a pledge or
mortgage. As distinguished from the term "pignus,"
in the same law, it denoted a mortgage, whether of
lands or of goods, in which the subject in pledge
remained in the possession of the mortgagor or debtor; whereas in the pignus the mortgagee or creditor
was in the possession. Such an hypotheca might be
either express or implied; express, where the parties
upon the occasion of a loan entered into express
agreement to that effect; or implied, as, e.g., in the
case of the stock and utensils of a farmer, which were
subject to the landlord's right as a creditor for rent;
whence the Scotch law of hypothec.
The word has suggested the term "hypothecate," as
used in the mercantile and maritime law of England.
Thus, under the factor's act, goods are frequently said
to be hypothecated;" and a captain is said to have a
right to hypothecate his vessel for necessary repairs.
11

Hypothecarta actio /h;p~keriy; ri:ksh(iy)ow/.

Husgablum / huwsga:bl;m/. In old English law, house

vii

Huteslum et clamor /hy;tfyz(h)(i)y;m et khi:m;r I. Hue

Husband. A married man; one who has a lawful wife

Husbandman.

~

London hustings. Also the raised place from which
candidates for seats in parliament address the constituency, on the occasion of their nomination.
Courts of Husting in England no longer exist.

Lat.
In the civil law, an hypothecary action; an action for
the enforcement of an hypotheca, or right of mortgage; or to obtain the surrender of the thing mortgaged.

Hypothecartl credltores / h;po8:akeriyay kred;t6riyz/.

Lat. In the civil law, hypothecary creditors; those
who loaned money on the security of an hypotheca
(q.v.).

Hypothecary action /h;p~kehriy zksh;n/. The name

of an action allowed under the civil law for the
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SPOT
Spot. In commodity trading and in foreign exchange,

immediate delivery in contrast to a future delivery.
Spot price. The selling price of commodities or goods.

Cash sales for immediate delivery in
contrast to trading In futures.

Spot trading.

Spot zoning. Granting of a zoning classification to a

piece of land that differs from that of the other land
in the immediate area. Term refers to zoning which
singles out an area for treatment different from that
of similar surrounding land and which cannot be
justified on the bases of health, safety, morals or
general welfare of the community and which ls not in
accordance with a comprehensive plan Schadlick v.
City of Concord, 108 N.H. 319, 234 A.2d 523, 526.
Spousals /spli~lz/. In old English law. mutual prom-

ises to marry.
Spouse. One's wife or husband.

Spouse-breach. In old English law, adultery.
Spread. In general, a difference between two amounts.
In stock and commodity trading, the difference between the bid and asked price. In arbitrage (q.v.),

the difference between two markets in the price or
value of a currency.
Spring-branch. A branch of a stream, flowing from a

spring.
Springing use. See Use.

Wiretapping.

Square. As used to designate a certain portion of land

within the limits of a city or town. this tenn may be
synonymous with "'block," that ls, the smallest subdivision which ls bounded on all sides by principal
streets, or it may denote a space (more or less rectangular) not built upon. and set apart for public passage, use, recreation. or ornamentation. in the nature
of a "park" but smaller.
Under government survey system, an area measuring 24 X 24 miles.
Just; settled; fair.
Public square. In its popular import, the phrase
refers to ground occupied by a courthouse and other
public buildings, normally at a point where two
streets meet. but it may be used as synonymous with
park.
Square block. Territory bounded by four streets.
People ex reL Beinert v. Miller, 100 Misc. 318, 165
N.Y.S. 602, 607; Bemfeld v. Freedenberg, 125 Misc.
645, 211 N. Y .S. 692.
Squatter. One who settles on another's land, without

Sprlnkllog trust. See Trust.
Spurious. False, counterfeit. not genuine.
Spurious bank-blll

A bill which may be a legitimate
impression from the genuine plate, but it must have
the signatures of persons not the officers of the bank
whence it purports to have issued, or else the names
of fictitious persons. It may also be an illegitimate
impression from a genuine plate, or an impression
from a counterfeit plate, but it must have such signatures or names as indicated A bill, therefore, may be
both counterfeit and forged, or both counterfeit and
spurious, but it cannot be both forged and spurious.
A spurious class action within
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ls merely a permissive joinder device where there is a common question
of law or fact and common relief is sought. involves
separate causes of action, is a matter of efficiency to
avoid multiplicity of actions, and each plaintiff must
be able to avoid bar of statute of limitations without
reference to the other causes of action. Athas v.
Day, D.C.Colo., 161 F.Supp. 916, 919. One in which
interests of members of class are several and not
interdependent, and where joinder is a matter of
efficiency to avoid multiplicity of suits. Slack v.
Stiner, C.A.Tex., 358 F.2d 65, 69. See also Class or

Spurious class acUon.

representative action.
Spurius /sp(y)ur(i)~s/sp5r 0

war among all civilized nations, a spy is punished
with death. Ex parte Milligan. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 44,
18 L.Ed 281 (argument of counsel). Gathering,
transmitting, or losing defense information with intent or reason to believe such information will be
used to the injury of the United States is a federal
crime. 18 U.S.C.A. § 793 et seq. See Espionage.
To watch or listen to secretly. See Eavesdropping;

Lat. In the civil law, a
bastard; the offspring of promiscuous cohabitation.
/.

Spy. A person sent into an enemy's camp to inspect

their works, ascertain their strength and their intentions, watch their movements, and secretly communicate intelligence to the proper officer. By the laws of

legal title or authority. A person entering upon
lands, not claiming in good faith the right to do so by
virtue of any title of his own or by virtue of some
agreement with another whom he believes to hold the
title. Under former laws, one who settled on public
land in order to acquire title to the land
Squatter's right. See Adverse possession.

Squeeze-out. A merger effected for no valid business
purpose and resulting in the elimination of a minority
shareholder is commonly referred to as a "freeze-out"
or a "squeeze-out". It may be defined as the use of
corporate control vested in the statutory majority of
shareholders or the board of directors to eliminate
minority shareholders from the enterprise or to reduce to relevant insignificance their voting power or
claims on corporate assets. Furthermore. it implies a
purpose to force upon the minority shareholder a
change which is not incident to any other business
goal of the corporation. Gabhart v. Gabhart, Ind.,
370 N.E.2d 345, 353.
Squire. A contraction of "esquire."

An abbreviation used in that part of a record,
pleading, or affidavit, called the "'statement of the
venue." Commonly translated or read, "to-wit," and
supposed to be a contraction of "scHJcet."

SS.

S.S.A. Social Security Administration.

s.s.1.

Supplemental Security Income.

S.S.S. Selective Service System.
Stabllla /sbbfl(i)y~/.

A writ called by that name,
founded on a custom in Normandy, that where a man
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TERRY R. SPENCER, Ph.D., P.C •• #6335
SPENCER & COLLJER, PLLC
Attomey for Respondent
140 West 9000 South, Suite 9
Sandy, Utah 84070
Telephone: (801) 566"1884
Fax: (801) 748-4022
e-mail: terry@trspencer.com
IN 1HE FOURTII JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUN1Y, STATE OF UTAH.

PETITION FOR MODIFICATION

DEAN WI-DTE,
Petitioner,

1$

-vs-

Civil No.: 094401518

JULIE THACKERAY,

Judge: McDade

Respondent.

Comm.: Faulkner

COMES NOW THE RESPONDENT, Julie Thackeray, by and through counsel, Terry R.
Spencer of the Law Offices of Spencer & Collier, P.C., and hereby petitions this Court to modify

the child support award contained in the Order of Modificntion entered by this Court on
November 25, 2015, as follows:
IN SUPPORT OF THIS PETITION, Respondent states and alleges as follows:
1.

The parties were formerly husband and wife having been divorced pursuant to a

Decree of Divorce issued on or about February 11, 2010.

2.

vJ

On November 25, 2015, the Court reduced the ch~ld support payments to $991.00

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

based on Petitioner's claim that he was only capable of earing $3,997.00 rather than the

approximately $6,250.00 listed as Petitioner's income in the parties' Decree of Divorce.
3.

Following the entry of the November 25, 2015 Modification Order, Respondent

received documentation from Petitioner showing his actual income was $5,292.00 per month. A
copy of Petitioner's pay stub is attached hereto as Exhibit "A."

4.

Pursuant to Utah Gode Ann. §78B•l2-210(9)(a),whichprovides as follows:

A parent, legal guardian, or the office may at any time petition the court to adjust
the amount of a child support order if there has been· substantial change in
circumstances. A change in the base combined child support obligation table set
forth in Section 78B-12-301 is not a substantial change in circumstances for the
purposes of this Subsection (9).
. .
(b) For purposes of this Subsection (9), a substantial change in circumstances may
include:

a

(iii) material changes of 30% or more in the income of a parent;

s.

Petitioner's income increase from $3,997.00 per .month to $5,292.00 per month,

an increase of approximately 32%.
6.

Thus, Respondent meet the statutory requirements (has shown a substantial and

material change in circwnstances) for an increase in the child support she receives from $991.00

~

per month to $1,128.00 per month. A copy of the Child Support Worksheet is attached hereto as
Exhibit 11B. 11
WHEREFORE, based on the infonnation presented above, the Court should adjust

Petitioner's child support obligation to $1,128.00 per month. beginning with the month of May
2015 based on Petitioner's attempts to hide his actual income from Respondent and the Court.

Ill
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Dated this 7di day of July, 2016•

.st~

Terry R. SpenceE
Afflant
(j)
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Frequently Asked Questions - Custodial Parents

Utah.gov Services

Agencies

Search all o f Utah .gov»

uloh departmen t o

human service~
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• External Links
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Ernployer lnfo·r1
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Housi1g \/enficat1on
ORS Interactive C 1se
Access System
ORS Program:;;

• Contact ORS Wcbmaster

1. What is the function of the Office of
Recovery Services Child Support
Program?
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Custodial Parents
Frequently Asked Questions

4. How do I open a child support case?
5. What information does ORS/CSS need to
proceed with a case.
6. What if I can't answer all of the questions in
the application form?
7. How long after a case is opened will I
receive child support?
8. What about collecting child care?
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9. How do I find out who my agent is?

10. What happens if the non-custodial parent
owes support to another person too?
11. Can I also use a private child support
collection agency while I have an open case
with ORS/CSS?

12. Who do I ca ll for more information?
13. How can I get my child support amount
raised?

What is the function of the Office of Recovery
Services Child Support Program?
The Office of Recovery Services (ORS), is an
agency located within the Utah Department of

•

Human Services. Within ORS, Child Support
Services (CSS), is responsible for collecting child
and medical support. Services include locating
parents, establishing paternity, establishing and
modifying ch ild support orders, and enforcing child
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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orders and medical insurance obligations.
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~

ORS/CSS can also collect spousal support
(alimony) if a dollar amount is ordered with child
support in the divorce decree.
Back to Top

~

What about custody and visitation issues?

ORS/CSS does not address legal custody or
visitation issues. To determine these issues
initially, we suggest you hire a private
attorney. Utah law requires the child support
obligation to follow the child. This means we will
enforce the support obligation against the parent
who does not have physical custody of the child. If
neither parent has physical custody of a child who
is living with a relative, we will enforce the
obligations of both parents. When physical
custody of the child changes, we may enforce the
obligation against the other parent (or parents)
without modifying the order.

~

~

~

If you are having problems with court ordered
visitation or custody because you do not know the
location of the other parent, ORS/CSS may be
able to send an address request to the Federal
Parent Locator Service.

~

Back to Top
~

Can you collect support even if the other
parent lives in another state?

Yes. If a non-custodial parent lives in another
state, ORS/CSS will either send a notice to
withhold income directly to the parent's employer
in the other state or will ask that state to pursue
child support collection. Even though each state
operates independently from another, each is
subject to Federal rules regarding how a child
support case is handled. Once the case is sent to
the other states child support agency, the case
becomes that states case, and ORS/CSS cannot
dictate how the case is handled.

~

~

~.

Back to Tog

How do I open a child support case?

~
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Child support services are available to parents
and relatives who fill out and sign a child support
application . Also, anyone receiving public
assistance or Medicaid will automatically be
referred to ORS/CSS for child support collection.
Back to Top

What information does ORS/CSS need to
proceed with a case?
The more information you provide in the
application, the better. Also, be sure to attach to
the application copies of all appropriate legal
documents, such as: birth certificates, Voluntary
Declaration of Paternity documents, divorce
decrees, judgments, order modifications, etc. You
will be contacted if ORS/CSS needs further
information to proceed.
Back to Top

What if I can't answer all of the questions in
the application form?
It is extremely important that you provide as much
information as possible so ORS/CSS can proceed
with your case and that you cooperate with
ORS/CSS in collection efforts. Often the
information that you provide to us makes the
biggest difference in how effectively your case is
worked. Although ORS/CSS has access to many
state and federal sources which provide us with
addresses and other information, some of this
information is out-of-date by the time we receive
it. We suggest that you fill out the necessary
forms to the best of your ability, consulting copies
of tax forms, military papers, vehicle registrations,
family members and friends, etc., as necessary to
find the information; then if you learn about more
information later, call the Customer Service Unit
(CSU) and report it. It can help our efforts to
collect support.
Back to Top

How long after a case is opened will I receive
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Unfortunately, there are no guarantees that child
support will be collected. Although ORS/CSS has
access to many location sources and has many
enforcement techniques available, including the
option to take parents to court for civil contempt
and criminal non-support, there will always be
instances where child support cannot be
collected.

~

In general, ORS/CSS will open a case record
within 20 days of receiving an application and will
begin to take necessary action on the case. The
length of time each case takes depends on what
action needs to be taken (for example, paternity
must be established before an order can be
established; and an order must be established
before ORS/CSS can begin collecting.) For more
information on case processing time frames, read
the Notice of Services.

~

~

~

Back to Tog

What about collecting child care?
~

ORS/CSS can only collect child care at the
request of either parent if the child care amount is
included in a court order along with a child
support obligation, and neither parent is disputing
the monthly amount. ORS will try to enforce pastdue child care expenses if you obtain a judgment
from the court.

~

Back to Tog
~

How do I find out who my agent is?
For questions about your case, you should call the
appropriate Customer Service Unit (CSU). The
only time you would need to contact a particular
agent is if his/her phone number is listed on a
letter or notice you receive from ORS/CSS, or the
agent contacts you for further information.
Although you may not speak to the same person
each time you call CSU, each CSU
representative is able to assist you with questions
and concerns about your case, such as case
status requests. For routine payment questions,
you can call our automated phone line 24 hours a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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posted and/or sent. If you have a complaint about
the way your case is being handled, it is also
appropriate that you contact CSU as a first step in
resolving issues.

vb

Please keep in mind that ORS/CSS (and the
Office of the Attorney General) does not represent
either parent. The role of ORS/CSS is to ensure
that children receive the support to which they are
entitled. If you are unhappy with the level of
service you receive at ORS/CSS, it may suit your
situation better for you to hire a private attorney or
contract with a private agency.

vi

Back to Top

vo

What happens if the non-custodial parent
owes support to another person too?
~

When ORS/CSS receives a payment, the
payment is prorated to current support in all cases
to which the non-custodial parent owes.
Back to Top

~

Can I also use a private child support
collection agency while I have an open case
with ORS/CSS?
~

ORS/CSS will not automatically close your case
when you contract with a private agency or
attorney but you will be required to provide
ORS/CSS with the name and address of the
private agent. It is also essential that you and the
private agent keep ORS/CSS informed of actions
taken on your behalf. ORS/CSS will be unable to
change the name of the payee on the case to the
private agent or attorney because support checks
issued by ORS/CSS must be made payable in
accordance with 45 CFR 302.38, which requires
the payments be made in the name of the
"resident parent, legal guardian, or caretaker
relative having custody of or responsibility for the
child or children."

~

~

~

Back to Top
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For more information about child support services,
including processing time frames, fees, etc.,
please read the Notice of Services. Also, for
general information or for information about your
case, you may call the Customer Service Unit
(CSU) in any of the ORS/CSS offices.
Back to Top

How can I get my child support amount
raised?
In Utah, child support obligations are computed
using an income shares formula established by
the Utah State legislature. This means that both
parent's incomes are used to compute the
monthly child support amount. The number of
children and other factors are also used to
determine how much obligated parents are
required to pay. Child support guidelines
worksheets and tables are used to calculate
support obligations. If you believe the amount of
current child support should be raised, it may be
possible to pursue a review and adjustment of the
support amount through ORS/CSS if there has
been a substantial change in circumstances, or it
has been more than three years since the order
was issued, modified, or reviewed. The review will
determine whether the child support amount
should be adjusted. An adjustment is the change
to the ordered amount, which will result in a
modification of your order. If an adjustment is
appropriate, the new amount could be higher
or lower than the amount in your present
order. Before you request that ORS/CSS
conduct a review and adjustment, you may want
to estimate what the new support amount could
be. ORS/CSS has prepared a pre-review packet
with worksheet forms and instructions which you
or the other parent may use to do the estimate.
Click here to find out about the pre-review
process and to read and print appropriate forms
and worksheets. If you want to request a review
and adjustment of your support amount, please
make your request in writing to ORS/CSS. If you
request a review and adjustment and later ask to
stop the process, it can only be stopped if the
other parent does not request that it continue. If
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the process is stopped, neither parent can request
a review for a period of one year.
Back to Top
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